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GATT AS A PUBLIC INSTITUTION: THE
URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND
Kenneth W. Abbott*
I. INTRODUCTION
As the GATT-MTN system' develops, the institutions at its
core become ever more complex. The Uruguay Round (Round)
- the broadest and most complex round of trade negotiations in
GATT's history - will heap unprecedented responsibilities on
the system,2 requiring greater institutional development than
ever before.3 Some of the necessary innovations may be agreed
upon in the final stages of the Round itself. Many of them, how-
ever, will of necessity be dealt with in subsequent negotiations,
or will simply evolve through practice, consistent with GATT
tradition.4  This article presents a theoretical framework
designed to structure and inform analysis of these broad institu-
tional issues. It then reviews the major institutional contribu-
tions of the Round .to date - although as this is written, in No-
vember 1991, the final outcome is far from clear -and offers
suggestions for the future.
Most discussions of GATT as an institution - particularly
those relating to rule-making, dispute settlement, enforcement
and similar processes - are organized around dichotomies, op-
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. I would like to thank
Robert Hudec for his helpful suggestions.
1. The "GATT-MTN system" refers to the increasingly complex body of agree-
ments, institutions and procedures created and administered under the general aegis of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The primary elements of the sys-
tem are the General Agreement itself and the agreements on nontariff measures pro-
duced by the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations (MTN). See generally
John H. Jackson, The Birth of the GATT-MTN System: A Constitutional Appraisal, 12
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 21 (1980).
2. John H. Jackson, GATT and the Future of International Trade Institutions, 18
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 11 (1992) [hereinafter Jackson, GATT and the Future].
3. The Uruguay Round negotiating group on the Functioning of the GATT System
- or at least some of its members - recognized this need explicitly, Decision on the
Functioning of the GATT System, in DRAr URUGUAY ROUND PACKAGE, infra note 79, at
321, 323 [hereinafter FOGS Draft Decision], but was unable to recommend any particu-
lar institutional innovations.
4. Most of the current GATT institutions and procedures evolved in this way, since
the severance of the General Agreement from the proposed Charter of the International
Trade Organization left GATT with a wholly inadequate institutional structure. See gen-
erally ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 49-
58, 67-73 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter HUDEc, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM].
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posing conceptions of the process or the institution. While vari-
ants can be found, two dichotomies dominate the literature. The
most common is legalism vs. pragmatism. This figures in well-
known writings by Kenneth Dam,5 Olivier Long,' and Robert
Hudec,7 among others.6 The other dichotomy is John Jackson's
distinction between rule-oriented and power-oriented proce-
dures and diplomacy.9 Although it is possible to tease out differ-
ences between some legalists or pragmatists and others,10 and
between legalists and supporters of rule-oriented diplomacy,
these dichotomies are roughly parallel in their views of GATT
rule-making, dispute settlement, and enforcement.
In this article I propose an additional dichotomy for think-
ing about GATT institutional issues, the dichotomy between in-
stitutions and procedures designed to serve the public interest
and those designed to serve private interests. In the present
context, the term "public" refers to the common interests of the
nations forming the world trading community, while "private"
refers to the particular interests of the individual states, the
contracting parties of GATT."
5. KENNETH DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 3-5
(1970).
6. OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYS-
TEM 61-64 (1987) [hereinafter LONG].
7. See Robert E. Hudec, GATT or GABB? The Future Design of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 80 YALE L.J. 1299, 1299-1300, 1304 (1971) [hereinafter
Hudec, GATT or GABB?]; Robert E. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement After the To-
kyo Round. An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 151-53 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter Hudec, Unfinished Business].
8. For other examples, see Meinhard Hilf, Settlement of Disputes in International
Economic Organizations: Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Strengthening the
GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures, [hereinafter Hilf] in THE NEW GATT ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 285, 289 (Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann and Meinhard Hilf, eds., 2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter THE NEW GATT
ROUND] (diplomatic or political vs. quasi-judicial or legally-structured); Phillip R.
Trimble, International Trade and the "Rule of Law," 83 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1017
(1985) (legalist vs. pragmatist); William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 65 (1987) (legal vs. political).
9. See, e.g., John H. Jackson, Governmental Disputes in International Trade Rela-
tions: A Proposal in the Context of GATT, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1 (1979); John H.
Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 98 (1978).
10. In fact, virtually all commentators agree that some balance between legalism
and pragmatism must be struck (as in any legal system); their positions thus range
across the legal/political spectrum. See Hilf, supra note 8, at 289-90.
11. I wish to distinguish, in other words, the distinction between governments or
international organizations, on the one hand, and individuals or private firms on the
other.
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The public/private distinction is intellectually rich. It has
interesting theoretical roots and leads to intellectual connections
that the GATT fraternity does not normally make. Even more
important, the public/private dichotomy provides perspectives
on the nature of GATT as an institution - under both its tradi-
tional arrangements and the reforms negotiated in the Uruguay
Round - that differ from, while intersecting, those of the tradi-
tional legalist and pragmatist positions. Indeed, the public/pri-
vate distinction helps illuminate the legalist and pragmatist po-
sitions themselves, revealing that both of them, perhaps
surprisingly, operate largely on the private side of the
dichotomy.
Even a private interests approach, it turns out, suggests
some criticisms of GATT dispute settlement and other institu-
tional arrangements. At the same time, as I suggest in a recent
article, the private interests approach provides a strong and con-
sistent rationale for many of the Uruguay Round dispute settle-
ment reforms.12 The focus of the present article, though, is on
the public interest side of the dichotomy. My major thesis is
that GATT is, or is becoming, a public institution with public
functions. This status has broad implications for a wide range of
institutional issues.
As one relatively minor but suggestive example, it means
that I really should stop using the standard term "dispute settle-
ment." Professor Hudec, wonderfully droll, calls this "a nice sort
of non-adversarial, non-threatening, look-at-the-positive side
phrase . . . .", The term does, however, suggest a procedure
primarily concerned with terminating conflict between private
interests, and so tends to prejudge important issues. I may be
forced to use the term for want of a satisfactorily neutral one,
but I do so with the caveat that even this innocuous expression
carries heavy baggage.
II. PRIVATE INTERESTS, THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND GATT
A. Reactive and Activist Communities
The theoretical roots of the analytical approach I propose
12. See Kenneth W. Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution: Build-
ing a Private-Interests System of Justice, - COLUM. Bus. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992)
[hereinafter Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution].
13. Robert E. Hudec, "Transcending the Ostensible": Some Reflections on the Na-
ture of Litigation Between Governments, 72 MINN. L. REv. 211, 214 (1987).
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lie in efforts to understand alternative ways of organizing soci-
ety. These efforts have typically been directed at national or do-
mestic societies, but a similar analysis can, with caution, be ap-
plied to any organized community, including the community of
trading nations organized around GATT.
I have drawn primarily on the work of Mirjan Damaska, 14 a
leading scholar of comparative law, whose writings in this area
build on ideas advanced by Bruce Ackerman.15 Damaska's work
is an effort to understand the varied systems for administering
justice within states; he is especially concerned to make intelligi-
ble the similarities and differences between the common and the
civil law. 6 To get at the heart of these systems, Damaska ana-
lyzes them in terms of an abstract dichotomy between two ideal
types, two extreme, opposing conceptions of the state and its
role in administering justice.17 Damaska calls these the reactive
state and the activist state.'s In my terminology, these corre-
spond to communities attuned, respectively, to private interests
and the public interest. 9
The extreme reactive community has no independent com-
munal goals, no view of the good society apart from the private
interests of its individual members. The autonomy and satisfac-
tion of its members is the community's highest value. The com-
munity's only role is to provide a framework for the pursuit of
private interests. Most rules are the product of private agree-
ment; legislation only tries to mimic what members would agree
to, and actual agreements will override it, as is the case, for ex-
ample, in most United States corporation law. Such legislation
aside, community institutions function only to maintain order
and to provide a forum for resolving disputes.2 °
Since the community has no independent interests, the only
legally cognizable disputes are those between private actors. The
14. MIRJAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986) [hereinafter DAMIASKA].
15. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 23-37 (1984).
16. DAMASKA, supra note 14, at 1-3.
17. DAMASKA, supra note 14, at 10-12. Damaska also examines systems of justice in
terms of a separate dichotomy, that between "hierarchical" and "coordinate" approaches
to the organization of institutions. This aspect of his theory is not applied here.
18. DAMASKA, supra note 14, at 71-73.
19. For a recent use of the public/private distinction to analyze approaches to racial
desegregation, distinguishing, among other things, alternate perceptions of the harm and
alternate approaches to remedy, see James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-
Out" School Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1463 (1990).
20. DAMASKA, supra note 14, at 73-77.
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community neither initiates dispute proceedings nor intervenes
in them. Proceedings only start when one member brings a claim
against another for damage to its private interests, and that pri-
vate conflict defines the entire proceeding. Only parties that
share the same claim may intervene. Procedures are adversarial
and controlled by the parties. Community institutions are con-
cerned only with "conflict-solving" or resolving the private dis-
pute. The resemblance to United States civil procedure is
clear.2
The reactive community also tries to remain wholly neutral.
For example, while autonomous parties can settle their disputes
at any time, once formal proceedings are under way the commu-
nity does not encourage settlement. To do so might compromise
its neutrality and make it more difficult to maintain order.22
An extreme activist community has a definite communal vi-
sion of the public good and uses all tools at its disposal, includ-
ing its legal system, to implement that vision. The autonomy
and satisfaction of individual members are not sacrosanct; their
interests may have to be sacrificed for the good of society. New
norms come from legislation or executive decree, not private ar-
rangements. Community institutions function actively to elabo-
rate and implement community policy.
23
The administration of justice is not limited to the resolution
of private disputes. The community can initiate proceedings
when it sees a need for them. When a private claim is made,
community institutions can take an active part in the proceed-
ing. They may raise additional issues, bring in additional parties
(so the proceeding can deal with a social problem of which the
dispute is a symptom), or seek broader relief. Procedures tend to
be inquisitorial, not controlled by the parties. Settlement may
be prohibited. In general, the role of institutions of justice is to
apply community policy, not to resolve private conflicts. Here
the resemblance is to Continental/European procedure, criminal
procedure, and modern "structural reform" litigation in the
United States. 24
Neither of these conceptions of government and society, at
least in its extreme form, is in any way attractive. The pure re-
active or private interests model is lifeless and potentially anar-
21. DAMASKA, supra note 14, at 77-80.
22. DAMASKA, supra note 14, at 78-79.
23. DAMASKA, supra note 14, at 80-84.
24. DAMASKA, supra note 14, at 84-88.
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chic; the pure activist or public interest model is only a small
step from Orwell's 1984. Few if any modern states come close to
either extreme, and I do not recommend the adoption of either.
The models do, however, help us to think about GATT as an
institution.
B. GATT and the Public Interest
When one looks at GATT in terms of Professor Damaska's
dichotomy, one is immediately struck by the extent to which the
organization and its procedures reflect the reactive or private in-
terests model.
1) The rhetoric of the contracting parties has emphasized
autonomy, sometimes to an extreme.2 5 Such rhetoric was strong-
est in the "anti-legalist" 1960s and 1970s, when major con-
tracting parties began to violate GATT rules and refused to sub-
mit their sovereign actions to community scrutiny: ignoring the
waiver process, refusing to participate in GATT review proce-
dures, and characterizing resort to third-party dispute proce-
dures as an unfriendly act. 6 More generally, the demand for au-
tonomy is reflected in the contracting parties' insistence on
consensus voting procedures, 27 which has given respondent
states the ability to block the creation of dispute settlement
panels and the adoption of panel reports.2
2) The institutional underpinnings of GATT are weak. It
was carefully designed to have none of the attributes of an "or-
25. The rhetoric of autonomy is associated with the same contracting parties, nota-
bly the European Communities, who for many years opposed the emergence of "legal-
ism" in GATT. This is ironic, since a true private interests approach would naturally
support many elements of a legal system. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 93-94.
26. See Hudec, GATT or GABB?, supra note 7, at 1303-04, 1343-46.
27. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYsTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 49-51 (1989) [hereinafter JACKSON, WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM].
28. These procedures are enshrined, though somewhat ambiguously, in the Under-
standing Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance
agreed upon in the Tokyo Round, November 28, 1979, (L/4907) para. 10, GATT, BISD
(26th Supp.) 210 (1980) [hereinafter Understanding Regarding Notification], and the
annexed Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field of
Dispute Settlement (Article XXIII:2), para. 6(ii) [hereinafter Agreed Description]; and
in a 1982 Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement Procedures, November 29,
1982, (L/5424) para. (x), GATT, BISD (29th Supp.) 13 (1982) [hereinafter Dispute Set-
tlement Procedures]. See Robert E. Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication Practices:
The Lessons of the DISC Case, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1464, 1483 (1988) [hereinafter
Hudec, Reforming GATT].
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ganization, ' '2 and its powers are limited."0 Indeed, the General
Agreement itself is still only provisionally applied, with con-
tracting parties able to withdraw for any reason on sixty days
notice.3 1 As a result, GATT as an institution has often been una-
ble to act contrary to the wishes of the individual contracting
parties, certainly those that are economically and politically
powerful.
3) GATT norms and rules are formed almost entirely by
agreement, not by "legislation." 32 Art. XXV of the General
Agreement does authorize the CONTRACTING PARTIES, act-
ing jointly, to take actions furthering the objectives of the
Agreement and to act by majority vote. Although important de-
cisions have been taken under this authority, 3 however, the
power has been used cautiously, and decisions have normally
been made by consensus. GATT is generally seen as a forum for
negotiation.3 4
29. See HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYsTEM, supra note 4, at 51.
30. See generally Jackson, GATT and the Future, supra note 2.
31. Protocol- of Provisional Application to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, opened for signature October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 308 reprinted in IV GATT, BISD 77 (1969) [hereinafter Protocol of Provi-
sional Application], para. 5. The Protocol provides that Part II of the General Agreement
shall only apply to the extent not inconsistent with existing national legislation. *Id. para.
1(b). Negotiators in the Uruguay Round have proposed eliminating this "grandfather
clause" as of a date to be established. See Understanding on Paragraph 1(b) of the
Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and
Corresponding Provisions in Protocols of Accession in DRAFT URUGUAY ROUND PACKAGE,
infra note 79, at 318.
32. A particularly clear example of the difference is the set of "codes" or "side
agreements" entered into by varying groups of nations as part of the Tokyo Round of
trade negotiations. These agreements are open to all contracting parties, but no state is
required to adhere. The results of one Tokyo Round negotiating group, the Group
Framework, were, in contrast, adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, by consen-
sus, as a decision; this process shares elements of both agreement and legislation. The
Tokyo Round agreements and decisions are reprinted in GATT, BISD (26th Supp.)
(1980).
33. See, e.g., Decision of June 25, 1971, (L/3545), GATT, BISD (18th Supp.) 24
(1972) (authorizing Generalized System of Preferences); Decision of November 28, 1979,
(L/4903) GATT, BISD (26th Supp.) 203 (1980) (authorizing differential treatment of de-
veloping countries).
34. See, e.g., LONG, supra note 6, at 21-42. Interestingly, the Ministerial Declara-
tion on the Uruguay Round, September 20, 1986, GATT, BISD (33d Supp.) 19 (1987)
[hereinafter Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round], reflected a decision of the
trade ministers of the contracting parties of GATT, "meeting on the occasion of the
Special Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES," to initiate multilateral trade negoti-
ations "within the framework and under the aegis of" GATT. GATT as an institution, in
short, did not even initiate the Round; the contracting parties simply utilized its institu-
tions as a locus for negotiation. Negotiations on services were even more carefully disas-
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4) Dispute settlement proceedings are initiated only by indi-
vidual contracting parties. 5 Claims are typically based on "nulli-
fication or impairment" of the claimant state's private benefits.3
Remedies are often said to be aimed at restoring the balance of
advantage between the parties to the case. 7
5) The panel process is adversarial and is generally party-
controlled, although panels may question the parties, request
additional information, and consult with other authorities.3 8
Panels consider only the matters raised by the claimant state .3
GATT functions primarily as a neutral conflict-resolver.
6) Participation of third parties has been limited to states
with a substantial interest in the matter, excluding those with a
general interest in the legal issues involved or the precedential
effects of the outcome.40
(One discrepancy also stands out: GATT institutions ac-
tively encourage settlement at every stage of a dispute proceed-
ing. I will return to this point below.)
These factors certainly suggest that the GATT contracting
parties have seen themselves, at best, as constituting a private
interests community. In spite of the strong resemblance, how-
ever, the pure private interests model is not wholly appropriate
for GATT. In terms of the most fundamental criterion differen-
tiating the two sides of the public/private dichotomy, GATT is a
public interest institution. It was created with a vision of the
public good, a set of common goals, principles and norms
(designed to restrain national autonomy) that the contracting
parties believed should govern the world trading community.
The whole point of the ITO/GATT negotiations was to give
these principles concrete form, in hopes of avoiding the mistakes
sociated from GATT as an institution. See id., Part II.
35. See Understanding Regarding Notification, supra note 28, paras. 8-10. See gen-
erally Rosine Plank, An Unofficial Description of How a GATT Panel Works and Does
Not, 4 J. INT'L ARB. 53, 56-59 [hereinafter Plank].
36. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature October 30,
1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 86, art. XXIII T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 reprinted in IV
GATT, BISD 1-78 (1969) [hereinafter General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade].
37. See, e.g., LONG, supra note 6, at 65-66.
38. See Agreed Description, supra note 28, para. 6(iv); see generally Plank, supra
note 35, at 64-65.
39. This focus is specified in the standard terms of reference under which most
panels work. Those terms of reference charge the panel "[t]o examine the matter raised
by [the complainant state]. . . ." See infra text accompanying notes 125-27.
40. See Understanding Regarding Notification, supra note 28, para. 15.
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to which national autonomy had led in the past.4 '
The main elements of the GATT vision are set out in the
Preamble to the General Agreement:42 that barriers to trade
should be reduced and discriminatory treatment eliminated in
order to encourage economic prosperity and growth. A related
goal, not explicitly stated in the General Agreement, was to
eliminate sources of international conflict and war.4s The 1986
Ministerial Declaration that initiated the Uruguay Round elo-
quently set out as the goals of the Round the furtherance of
these very principles and the strengthening of GATT's ability to
implement them.44 A second part of the GATT vision, applicable
where government intervention in the economy is permitted,45 is
that protective measures should be channeled into transparent,
nondiscriminatory, and less-distortive forms.46 These principles
continue to form a fundamental community vision even as indi-
vidual rules are challenged and renegotiated.
The private interest bias of GATT institutional arrange-
ments is, to a considerable extent, a product of the unusual cir-
cumstances surrounding the birth of GATT. For one thing, the
roots of many GATT provisions and ways of thinking lay in bi-
lateral trade agreements,47 where the concept of a community
interest separate from the interests of the two parties has less
meaning. The early GATT tariff rounds, for example, were es-
41. See CLAIR WILcOx, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 3-13 (1949).
42. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 36.
43. Inefficient economic policies in the interwar years, it was believed, contributed
to the outbreak of World War II. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 27,
at 31.
44. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, supra note 34, Part I:A.
45. GATT was not intended to prohibit all government interference with trade. In
the aftermath of the New Deal, it was assumed that governments would intervene in
their economies and that the control of trade would necessarily be part of interventionist
policies. The notion of "free trade," in other words, was "embedded" in the broader
Keynesian consensus of the time. See John G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transac-
tions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG.
379, 384-88 (1982).
46. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Grey Area Policy and the Rule of Law, 22 J.
WORLD TRADE 23, 23-26 (1988).
47. The United States executive branch entered into negotiations to form the Inter-
national Trade Organization and reduce tariffs under the authority of the Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act, which previously had been used to negotiate bilateral tariff re-
duction agreements. GATT itself was put into effect in the United States under the au-
thority of that Act, which did not, at least according to many in Congress, authorize the
President to create an international organization. Finally, many of the provisions in the
draft ITO Charter and the GATT were taken from standard provisions in such agree-
ments. See HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 23-26.
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sentially elaborate sets of bilateral negotiations. In addition, it is
largely an historical accident that the rules of the world trading
community are found in the General Agreement: GATT was in-
tended only as a temporary tariff agreement, incorporating rules
designed to regulate nontariff measures that could affect care-
fully balanced tariff concessions and procedures designed to re-
store such balances bilaterally. 8
These factors, though, should not obscure the public ele-
ments in GATT's conception. These elements are reflected not
only in the Preamble of the General Agreement but in its rules, 49
including its intended link to the ITO.50 Public elements are
even inherent in GATT's structure, a remarkable fact given the
effort to avoid creating an international organization: as noted
above, the CONTRACTING PARTIES acting jointly have
broad general powers;51 they can grant waivers for noncomplying
national actions, and thus have the implied power to impose
conditions on such a grant;"2 they can make rulings and author-
ize retaliation; 53 and they are empowered to review and oversee a
variety of national measures. 4 Though these powers have always
been exercised flexibly, GATT's public functions were well un-
derstood by the first generation of "GATT hands."55
In recent years, GATT's public role has been widely recog-
nized. Today, GATT is rarely called a tariff agreement; instead,
the General Agreement, related agreements, and their various
institutions are typically referred to as "the multilateral trading
system."56 In the Leutwiler Report the group of "eminent per-
sons" formed in 1983 to study the problems of that system ex-
horted contracting parties to deemphasize bilateral differences
and "recognize that they share a common interest in the sys-
48. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 27, at 32-34; HUDEc, THE
GATT LEGAL SYsTEM, supra note 4, at 23-25.
49. An important example is art. X, by which the trading community sets minimum
standards for the procedures and even for the structure of national governments. Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 36, art. X.
50. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 36, art. XXVIII.
51. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 36, art. XXV:1.
52. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 36, art. XXV:5.
53. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 36, art. XXIII.
54. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 36, art. XXIV:7,
10 (customs unions); art. XII:4 (balance of payments measures).
55. See Hudec, GATT or GABB2, supra note 7, at 1336-42.
56. See, e.g., LONG, supra note 6; GATT, TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE:
PROPOSALS FOR ACTION (THE LEUTWILER REPORT) 18 (1985) [hereinafter GATT, TRADE
POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE].
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tem's survival, far outweighing any differences among them. ' 57
Professor Jackson speaks of GATT as having an evolving "con-
stitution." 58 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, a former GATT legal ad-
visor, observes that GATT has evolved from a short-term con-
tract designed to protect tariff concessions to "a permanent
world-wide trade agreement and an institutionalized legal
framework" for the liberalization of trade.59
These views have been supported by the evolution, slow to
be sure, of institutional attitudes and practices suggestive of a
public interest approach. In the area of dispute settlement, for
example, the Secretariat has come to play a large and increas-
ingly substantive role in the panel process as "guardian of the
General Agreement." 0 Participation by third contracting parties
in the proceedings of panels has increased, despite the restrictive
standard,61 occasionally to an extent that suggests community
intervention rather than participation by private parties simi-
larly situated. " A few panel decisions, generally highly conserva-
tive in legal technique, have been drafted with an eye toward
establishing workable community rules.63 More generally, there
appears to be evolving an attitude that strong dispute settle-
ment procedures are important not only to resolve conflict
among contracting parties but to ensure the success of agreed
57. GATT, TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE, supra note 56, at 33.
58. JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 2 (1990) [hereinafter
JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING]; JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 27, at 299-308.
59. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Strengthening the GATT Dispute Settlement Sys-
tem: On the Use of Arbitration in GATT, in THE NEW GATT ROUND, supra note 8, at
323-24 [hereinafter Petersmann, Strengthening the GATT].
60. Agreed Description, supra note 28, para. 6(iv). For a brief discussion of the Sec-
retariat's increased role, see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Preface: Some Observations on Dis-
pute Settlement in GATT, in PIERRE PESCATORE ET AL., HANDBOOK OF GATT DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT (1991) at xi, xiv-xv [hereinafter Lowenfeld].
61. See, e.g., Japan - Trade in Semiconductors, report of panel adopted May 4,
1988, GATT, BISD (35th Supp.) 116 (1989); US - Restrictions on Imports of Sugar,
report of panel adopted June 22, 1989, GATT, BISD (36th Supp.) 331 (1990); EEC -
Regulation of Imports of Parts and Components, report of panel adopted May 16, 1990,
(L/6657) GATT, BISD (37th Supp.) 132 (1991).
62. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report
on United States Restrictions on Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991).
63. See, e.g., U.S. - Customs User Fee, report of panel adopted Feb. 2, 1988,
GATT, BISD (35th Supp.) 245, paras. 76-77 (interpretation of "services rendered"), 78-
86 (policy analysis of fee calculation method) (1989); Japan - Restrictions on Imports
of Certain Agricultural Products, report of panel adopted March 22, 1988, GATT, BISD
(35th Supp.) 163, para. 5.1 (clarification of Art. XI requirements, policy analysis of bur-
den of proof) (1989).
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community rules.64
Finally, GATT's public role is clearly recognized in the doc-
uments of the Uruguay Round. The general objectives of the
Round set out in the Ministerial Declaration have already been
mentioned. 5 The more specific objectives of the negotiations on
the "functioning of the GATT system" (FOGS),"6 and especially
the midterm agreement on FOGS, 7 leave no doubt that GATT
is seen as the institutional representative of the world trading
community, with major public objectives and a public role of vi-
tal importance.
The FOGS agreement, for example, states that negotiators
were guided by their understanding of the contribution that
GATT could make "to ensure a further expansion and liberaliza-
tion of trade as well as a strengthened multilateral trading sys-
tem which are of vital importance to all contracting parties and
which are essential for the promotion of growth and develop-
ment."6 " The perception of GATT's public role is nicely summa-
rized in a statement by the chair of the ministerial meeting at
Punta del Este, where the Uruguay Round was initiated. It had
been proposed to include as an objective of the Round the re-
dressing of bilateral trade disequilibria; the chair suggested,
however, that this proposal was rejected because it might "lead
to a trading system incompatible with the basic objectives and
principles of GATT, the guarantor of the open and non-discrim-
inatory trading system."6"
Again, let me stress that I have no interest in adopting the
extreme model of an activist community summarized earlier. I
do believe, though, that GATT as an organization should con-
tinue to evolve in the direction of that model, with increasing
recognition of its public function and the development of appro-
priate powers and procedures, so that it can better pursue the
fundamental vision of the world trading community.
64. Petersmann, Strengthening the GATT, supra note 59, at 323, 326.
65. See supra note 44.
66. See Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, supra note 34, Part I:E.
67. Midterm Review Agreements, April 21, 1989, Part I, Functioning of the GATT
System (FOGS), sees. 1-3, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/11, reprinted in LAW AND PRACTICS
UNDER THE GATT, Part III, Uruguay Round (Kenneth R. Simmonds and Brian H.W.
Hill eds.) (1989) [hereinafter Midterm Review Agreements].
68. Id. at sec. 2(a).
69. See Statement by the Chairman of the Ministerial Meeting, GATT, BISD (33d
Supp.) 28, 29 (1987). The chair went on to add that the problem of trade imbalances
should be addressed by macro-economic policy. Id.
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III. THE URUGUAY ROUND AND GATT AS A PUBLIC INSTITUTION
A. Introduction
The 1986 Ministerial Declaration laid out ambitious goals
for the Uruguay Round.70 In terms of institutional issues, how-
ever, it mentioned few specifics. Increased multilateral surveil-
lance was set as a goal in various contexts, including the stand-
still and rollback commitments in force during the
negotiations,71 safeguard measures,72 and the implementation of
dispute settlement decisions.73 The FOGS group was entrusted
with a rather complete proposal for monitoring national trade
policies.74 Otherwise, the language was general.75
Both the dispute settlement and FOGS groups nonetheless
made significant progress, and made it early in the Round. By
the Midterm Review, December 1988 - April 1989, the dispute
settlement group had agreed on a lengthy package of "improve-
ments." These were immediately put into effect "on a trial ba-
sis" for the duration of the Round. 76 The FOGS group recom-
mended an ambitious Trade Policy Review Mechanism
(TPRM), based on the proposal in the Declaration, and an en-
hanced Council review of general developments in the interna-
tional trade environment; these too were put into effect provi-
sionally."' The FOGS group also recommended a more frequent
schedule of ministerial meetings.7 8
In preparation for the abortive Brussels ministerial meeting
of the Trade Negotiations Committee in December 1990, the va-
rious negotiating groups consolidated the results they had
achieved thus far into a "Draft Final Act," a "first approxima-
tion" of the package of agreements that was to have emerged
from the Round.79 The package included a lengthy draft "Un-
70. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, supra note 34, Part I:A.
71. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, supra note 34, Part I:C.
72. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, supra note 34, Part I:D.
73. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, supra note 34, Part I:D.
74. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, supra note 34, Part I:E (i).
75. E.g., Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, supra note 34, Part I:E
(ii)-(iii).
76. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, Dispute Settlement secs.
A:1-A:3.
77. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, FOGS, sec. 4:A-:E (Trade
Policy Review Mechanism), sec. 4:F (Overview of the International Trading
Environment).
78. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, FOGS, sec. 5.
79. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
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derstanding on the Interpretation and Application of Articles
XXII and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade" (the "Understanding"), building on the Midterm agree-
ment, but still including some "square brackets."' 0 A draft
FOGS decision recommended confirmation of the Midterm re-
sults and the adoption of an enhanced notification system."s
The Draft Final Act itself suggested that it would be desira-
ble to establish a new organizational structure "to provide the
administrative infrastructure" for the international implementa-
tion of the results of the Round.8 2 This language undoubtedly
relates to the European Communities proposal for the creation
of a new "Multilateral Trade Organization" (MTO), although
that title was only one option specified. Beyond the simple state-
ment that a new structure is needed, and agreement that the
details should somehow be worked out by the time the results of
the Round were formally implemented, 3 however, the Draft Fi-
nal Act included only a series of "square brackets" - alterna-
tive formulations of structure and scope that revealed significant
differences of opinion - and an Annex that was almost com-
pletely blank.8 4 The FOGS group also discussed the strengthen-
ing of GATT institutions, including the Secretariat, but it was
able to produce only an empty set of brackets.85
It will only be possible here to discuss the highlights of
these agreements and proposals. I will concentrate on those mat-
ters that are illuminated by the public/private dichotomy, and
will analyze them primarily from the public interest point of
Trade Negotiations [hereinafter Draft Final Act], November 1990, GATT Doc.
MTN.TNC/W/35 at 1-5. The various draft agreements, decisions, and understandings
that were prepared for the Brussels meeting were appended to the Draft Final Act and
organized into four annexes: 'Annex I (Uruguay Round Agreements on Trade in Goods);
Annex II (General Agreement on Trade in Services); Annex III (Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights); and Annex IV (Basic Elements of an
Organizational Agreement). The Draft Final Act and its Annexes are referred to hereaf-
ter as DRAFT URUGUAY ROUND PACKAGE.
80. Understanding on the Interpretation and Application of Articles XXII and
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in DRAFT URUGUAY ROUND
PACKAGE, supra note 79, at 289 [hereinafter Understanding].
81. FOGS Draft Decision, supra note 3, at 321-22, secs. 1-3.
82. Draft Final Act, supra note 79, at 3, para. 5.
83. Draft Final Act, supra note 79, at 3, para. 6.
84. Draft Final Act, supra note 79, at 3, paras. 5-6; Annex IV [Basic Elements of an
Organizational Agreement] in DRAFT URUGUAY ROUND PACKAGE, supra note 79, at 383.
85. FOGS Draft Decision, supra note 3, at 323, sec. 8; see also Commentary on
Decision on the Functioning of GATT System, in DRAFT URUGUAY ROUND PACKAGE,
supra note 79, at 320.
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Both the Midterm agreement on dispute settlement and the
Understanding (the "dispute settlement texts") begin with a
paragraph extolling the importance of the dispute settlement
systerm.56 The language of this paragraph generally reflects the
assumptions of a private interest community: it speaks, for ex-
ample, of providing security and predictability in trade and pre-
serving the rights of individual contracting parties. At the same
time, however, it recognizes an important role for community in-
stitutions in providing the legal infrastructure necessary for pri-
vate interaction. The rhetoric of this paragraph accurately sig-
nals the willingness of the Uruguay Round dispute settlement
negotiators to go beyond a passive or negative conception of the
private interests community (one emphasizing noninterference
by community institutions) and implement a more affirmative
conception."7
The paragraph even includes a hint of public interest think-
ing in its statement that dispute settlement procedures serve to
clarify the rules of the General Agreement. In the Understand-
ing, however, negotiators carefully cabined the more expansive
implications of this statement by adding that rulings under Arti-
cle XXIII cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
of contracting parties. This caveat seems to reflect a naive view
of the process of interpretation, but that is a subject for another
time. In the meanwhile, this particular public/private contro-
versy will be played out in individual panel decisions.
2. Settlement
An emphasis on voluntary settlement, even at the cost of
compromising the rules of the General Agreement, has long
characterized GATT dispute procedures. 8 The Uruguay Round
86. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, Dispute Settlement, sec.
A:1; Understanding, supra note 80, at 289, sec. A:2.
87. See Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution, supra note 12.
88. For a characteristic statement of this approach to dispute settlement, see Plank,
supra note 35, at 60 ("the nature of GAIT dispute settlement is to settle disputes satis-
factorily among members rather than to make law. A solution however imperfect to
which all parties agree (and which hopefully does minimal damage to GATT standards)
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dispute settlement texts continue, and in some ways heighten,
this emphasis. First, by explicitly adopting a set of working pro-
cedures for panels suggested by the Office of Legal Affairs in
1985,89 the texts continue, except as otherwise altered, the dis-
pute resolution procedures adopted at the end of the Tokyo
Round. Those procedures, adopted with the era of anti-legalism
still clearly in mind, attempt to minimize the possibility that the
losing parties in dispute settlement proceedings might fail to
comply with final decisions, weakening GATT's authority. Ac-
cordingly, they instruct panels to encourage settlement through-
out the process.9 0
In addition, the texts highlight the availability of good of-
fices, mediation, and conciliation as techniques for resolving dis-
putes by voluntary settlement.9' These techniques are permitted
to go forward at any time, even during the panel process, and
the Director-General of GATT is affirmatively authorized to of-
fer his services for any of the techniques "with the view to as-
sisting contracting parties to settle a dispute."92
From a private interests standpoint, the principle of auton-
omy means that in most situations, parties to a dispute should
be free to settle their disputes voluntarily. As I have argued else-
where, however,9" a true private interests community would be
reluctant to encourage settlement once litigation has begun, lest
it breach its obligation of neutrality. In addition, one of the ma-
jor roles for community institutions in a private interests com-
munity is to maintain order, typically through the use of en-
forcible rules. Compromise settlements sponsored by the
community in the course of litigation suggest that community
norms can be avoided. Finally, a true private interests commu-
is clearly preferred.")
89. See Understanding, supra note 80, at 294, sec. D:6(b); id. at 304-05 (Annex,
Suggested Working Procedures).
90. For a description of the rationale for this approach, see Hudec, Unfinished Busi-
ness, supra note 7.
91. These techniques are already available, though little used, in GATT procedure.
See Understanding Regarding Notification, supra note 28, para. 8; Dispute Settlement
Procedures, supra note 28, para. (i); Plank, supra note 35, at 61-62.
92. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part 1, Dispute Settlement, see.
D:3; Understanding, supra note 80, at 291, sec. C. Under previous procedures, the Direc-
tor-General was empowered to play a particularly strong role in cases involving com-
plaints by developing countries. See Procedures Under Article XXIII, Decision of April
5, 1966, GATT, BISD (14th Supp.) 18-20 (1966) [hereinafter Procedures Under Article
XXIII].
93. Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution, supra note 12.
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nity will endeavor to provide a system of basic entitlements
around which its members can efficiently negotiate and form pri-
vate arrangements. Compromise settlements blur public under-
standing of existing entitlements and fail to create new ones,
making private ordering more costly 4
A public interest community would be even more reluctant
to encourage compromise settlements, perhaps any settlements,
especially during litigation. Such a community is concerned with
the substantive outcome of dispute proceedings and the imple-
mentation of community policy. Decisions enforcing community
rules are seen not merely as bulwarks of minimum order and
neutral guideposts to private interaction, but as substantive acts
that guide the behavior of community members and force them
to bargain "in the shadow of the law" where private ordering is
allowed.95 As Professor Fiss puts it, the purpose of activist dis-
pute procedures is to help bring reality in line with community
values.96 When the community promotes or even visibly permits
a compromise settlement, at least in cases where the public in-
terest is involved, it forfeits an opportunity to implement its
principles, weakens those principles in the eyes of its members,
and makes future implementation more difficult.
Dispute proceedings in the public interest community also
serve an educational function, helping members of the commu-
nity to understand and accept its principles. To reinforce this
function, proceedings are typically open to the public, and deci-
sions are embodied in written, publicized opinions.97 Compro-
mise settlements, though, are often confidential; and even if they
are made public, they tend to undercut public understanding of
community policy.
Assuming settlement is to be allowed, intervention by the
Director-General98 could well influence states to agree on terms
more in line with community norms than they might reach on
their own. Other mediators might not have the same beneficial
impact, though, and even the Director-General could not always
94. Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution, supra note 12.
95. See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). Professor Jackson's
dichotomy between rule-oriented and power-oriented diplomacy emphasizes the influ-
ence of community rules ' on private bargaining. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM,
supra note 27, at 85-86.
96. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984).
97. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 36, art. X.
98. See supra text accompanying note 92.
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do so. No such influence, in any case, would be at work in di-
rectly negotiated settlements. From both a private interests and
a public interest point of view, then, procedures for community
control of negotiated settlements are crucial.
The Uruguay Round dispute settlement texts first set forth
the principle that "solutions" to disputes that have entered the
Article XXIII dispute process must be consistent with the Gen-
eral Agreement and must not impede any of its objectives (or
nullify or impair any contracting party's benefits).99 Under this
principle, at a minimum, country A could not settle a proceeding
brought by country B to challenge A's allegedly unjustified
quota by granting B its own favorable share of the quota; such a
settlement would run afoul of Article I of the General Agree-
ment. The principle could also be read more expansively. In the
hypothetical case just discussed, for example, if country A's
quota were found to be unlawful, the principle could be taken to
forbid a settlement whereby country A enlarged its quota on a
most-favored-nation (MFN) basis, since the outcome (the un-
derlying quota) would still be inconsistent with the General
Agreement.
However it is interpreted, though, the principle of consis-
tency with GATT law will have little effect without adequate
review procedures. Fairly strong proposals, including explicit au-
thorization for the Council to reject any settlements reached
during litigation, were made during the negotiations.100 The pro-
cedure actually decided upon, though, is disappointingly weak.
Settlements are simply to be notified to the Council, "where any
contracting party may raise any point relating thereto."''1 The
Council could conceivably still use its Article XXV authority to
disapprove particular settlements, but the texts make no refer-
ence to this possibility. It is small consolation that even this
minimal procedure, by putting settlements up to public view, is
an improvement on the 1979 Understanding, 102 assuming, that
99. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, Dispute Settlement, sec.
A:2; Understanding, supra note 80, at 289, sec. A:3.
100. See Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Summary and Comparative
Analysis of Proposals for Negotiations, Note by the Secretariat (Revision), Feb. 26,
1988, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG13/W/14/Rev.1, at 19-20 [hereinafter Negotiating
Group on Dispute Settlement].
101. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, Dispute Settlement, see.
B; Understanding, supra note 80, at 289, sec. A:4.
102. Under the 1979 Agreed Description, if the parties to a dispute settlement pro-
ceeding reach an agreed settlement the panel will terminate its work, issuing only a brief
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is, that contracting parties comply with their notification
obligation.103
Ironically, the continued commitment to encouraging settle-
ment is motivated at least in part by a public interest goal: to
preserve GATT as a functioning institution.104 Since GATT has
no coercive power, and the GATT community has less political
cohesion than most states, confrontations over dispute settle-
ment decisions have been seen as potentially fatal to the institu-
tion. Encouraging pre-decision settlement has been seen as one
way to avoid the problem. The Uruguay Round texts, however,
significantly strengthen the panel process and the related en-
forcement procedures,10 5 suggesting that the problem is regarded
as significantly less serious than in the past. The successful con-
clusion of the Round would, in fact, alleviate several traditional
sources of concern.106 At the least, then, future negotiations
should be aimed at strengthening community control over nego-
tiated settlements, particularly those reached during the panel
process.
3. Arbitration
The dispute settlement texts provide for a system of con-
sensual arbitration "within GATT" as an "alternative means of
dispute settlement.' 10 7 This is predominantly a private interests
regime. Arbitration is described as a way to resolve disputed is-
sues between particular states. Resort to arbitration is based
solely on agreement of the parties. The parties are empowered to
select both the arbitrators and the arbitration procedures.
Agreements to arbitrate must be notified to all contracting par-
ties, but the texts establish no procedure for their review. 08
Parties that choose to arbitrate, on the other hand, must
description of the case and a report that the case has been settled. Agreed Description,
supra note 28, para. 6(v). Individual contracting parties "with an interest in the matter"
will, however, on request, be given information about the settlement as it pertains to
trade. Understanding Regarding Notification, supra note 28, para. 19.
103. The FOGS Draft Decision, supra note 3, proposes a significant strengthening
of notification procedures. See infra part III(C).
104. See supra text accompanying note 90.
105. See infra part III.B.4.
106. See Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution, supra note 12.
107. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, Dispute Settlement, sec.
E:1; Understanding, supra note 80, at 301, sec. 0.
108. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, Dispute Settlement, sec.
E:1; Understanding, supra note 80, at 301, sec. 0.
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agree to be bound by the award, a rule seemingly designed to
avoid the longstanding problems of delay and blockage of panel
decisions by losing parties.10 9 Moreover, by the terms of the Un-
derstanding, a publicly oriented regime of Council surveillance
(applicable also to panel decisions) would encourage the imple-
mentation of arbitral awards. 110 These provisions can be ap-
plauded from both the public interest and private interests
points of view.
There are, however, some remarkable deficiencies in the ar-
bitration provisions, especially from a public interest perspec-
tive. One set of weaknesses relates to the structure of arbitral
tribunals. In a public interest community, the institutions of jus-
tice must be structured to promote the effective implementation
of community policy. Their personnel must be selected, installed
and supervised so that they see the implementation of commu-
nity policy as their official duty. Typically, institutions of justice
are publicly chartered, supported with public resources, and
staffed with persons chosen by the public, or by other officials so
selected, and sworn to uphold community norms."' While arbi-
tration and other forms of alternative dispute resolution" 2 may
be allowed, cases involving important public policies or regula-
tory programs are, or should be, reserved for the public
institutions.113
None of these concerns is dealt with in the dispute settle-
ment texts. While they vaguely suggest that arbitration is partic-
ularly suitable for purely private disputes," 4 parties appear to
be free to select arbitration, and any arbitral procedure they
109. See, e.g., Petersmann, Strengthening the GATT, supra note 59, at 336. The
dispute settlement texts would make blocking of panel decisions a much less serious
problem, however. See infra text accompanying notes 142-44.
110. For a discussion of proposals to strengthen the GATT surveillance regime, see
infra part IV(A)(4).
111. See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution,
62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 44-45.
112. For a discussion of "second-wave" alternate dispute resolution theory, which is
critical of the earlier enthusiasm, see Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolu-
tion, supra note 12.
113. See Bernard E. Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law and Labor Arbitra-
tion, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 545, 558-59 (1967). The allocation of important public policy
cases to the public institutions of justice is accomplished by the doctrine of arbitrability.
Id. This doctrine has undergone a revolution in the United States, culminating in the
international case of Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985); see infra text accompanying notes 229-32.
114. See Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, Dispute Settlement,
sec. E:I; Understanding, supra note 80, at 301, sec. 0:1.
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choose, in any case. Most serious, perhaps, the texts are silent as
to the identity or qualifications of arbitrators. This may not be
of great concern for disputes that are essentially private, like the
issue of appropriate compensation arbitrated during the Chicken
War," 5 but it is important for disputes in which public princi-
ples are at stake.
The negotiating group considered a proposal that parties
wishing to arbitrate should select arbitrators from the GATT
roster of panelists." 6 With the refinements to panel selection
proposed in the Understanding,"17 this procedure would have in-
corporated a set of minimum qualifications and made available a
group of pre-cleared nongovernmental panelists. Other elements
of the panel process - including a potential role for the Direc-
tor-General in the choice of panelists and the panelist's obliga-
tion of independence - might also have been carried over.""
Such procedures would likely produce arbitrators that were both
qualified and committed to the furtherance of GATT norms.
The provisions actually adopted do not create the same
confidence.
Other deficiencies relate to the grounds for arbitrators' deci-
sions. Most important, the dispute settlement texts do not re-
quire arbitrators to decide disputes in accordance with GATT
rules. This is surprising, since most GATT panels are currently
given standard terms of reference that require them to decide
"in the light of the relevant provisions of the General Agree-
ment," 119 a procedure that the Uruguay Round texts try to rein-
force.120 Arbitration awards, like settlements, are required to be
consistent with the General Agreement, 12 1 but here too the only
technique for enforcing consistency is the notification of awards
115. See Petersmann, Strengthening the GATT, supra note 59, at 338-39. For a full
description of the Chicken War incident, see 1 ABRAM CHAYES ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL PRocEss 249 (1969). The Understanding provides for the use of binding arbitra-
tion for a very similar circumstance, determining the proper amount of trade to be cov-
ered by the suspension of concessions in cases where retaliation is authorized by the
Council. See Understanding, supra note 80, at 300, secs. L:4-5.
116. See Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, supra note 100, para. 85.
117. See Understanding, supra note 80, at 292, sec. D:3.
118. See Agreed Description, supra note 28, para. 6(iii).
119. See Plank, supra note 35, at 64-65.
120. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, Dispute Settlement, sec.
F(b); Understanding, supra note 80, at 292, sec. D:2. See infra note 125 and accompany-
ing text.
121. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, Dispute Settlement, sec.
A:2; Understanding, supra note 80, at 289, sec. A:3.
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to the Council for possible comment. 122
Finally, while it appears that arbitrators are expected to is-
sue written awards - this can be deduced from the requirement
that awards be notified to the Council - there is no require-
ment that they prepare reasoned opinions or that such opinions
be made publicly available. If only bare awards are notified to
the Council, there will be little for contracting parties to com-
ment on, and, thus, little way to discipline arbitrators, even in-
formally, as to their grounds for decision. If contracting parties
cannot be certain that GATT rules are being applied, the au-
thority of those rules will necessarily be reduced. Finally, even if
arbitrators do apply GATT rules, the public interest goal of edu-
cating the community will only be achieved if the principled ba-
ses of their awards are publicly disseminated.
In sum, while a properly constituted arbitration regime
could play an important role in GATT, the arbitration proce-
dures contemplated by the Uruguay Round texts could retard
the evolution of GATT dispute settlement into a public interest
system of justice.
4. The Panel Process
a) General
The Midterm agreement on dispute settlement brought
about relatively minor refinements in the panel process, the cen-
tral dispute resolution mechanism of GATT. The Understand-
ing, however, would substantially change the process, for the
most part in ways long advocated by GATT legalists. As I have
discussed elsewhere, 123 these changes are largely informed by the
ideal of an affirmative private interests community, whose insti-
tutions seek to provide a sound framework for private ordering
and a neutral forum for the resolution of private disputes. 124 In-
deed, the Understanding would go far toward attaining that
ideal. Public interest elements, however, are distinctly
subordinate.
122. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, Dispute Settlement, sec.
B; Understanding, supra note 80, at 302, sec. 0:3.
123. See Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution, supra note 12.
124. The provisions on settlement, mediation, and arbitration are in some ways ex-
ceptions to this conclusion, just as they are problematic under a public interest concep-
tion of the dispute settlement process. Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Reso-
lution, supra note 12.
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Both texts would reinforce the use of standard terms of ref-
erence that explicitly charge panels to examine disputes "in the
light of the relevant GATT provisions.' 125 The standard terms
would be used in every case unless the parties to the dispute
decided on other terms within twenty days of the panel's estab-
lishment. If nonstandard terms of reference were agreed upon,
however, they would be circulated to all contracting parties, any
one of which could initiate a discussion of the terms in the
Council. This provision falls well short of mandating use of the
standard terms; indeed, it involves essentially the same weak
procedure used in the review of settlements. It should, however,
add some support to the presumption that GATT law is to be
fully applied in dispute settlement proceedings.
The texts envision a growing role for the Director-General
in the establishment of panels: he would be authorized, in con-
sultation with the Chair of the Council and the parties, to
"form" a panel, "appointing the panelists whom he considers
most appropriate," if the parties themselves could not agree on
panelists within twenty days.'2 6 In addition to avoiding delay,
this procedure should help ensure that panelists are not only
neutral and expert - important private interests goals - but
also committed to furthering community norms. Even if the Di-
rector-General rarely forms a panel, the possibility of his in-
volvement should influence the selections made by contracting
parties. The Understanding also sets out some of the qualifica-
tions a panelist should possess. 27
b) Right to a Panel
The Uruguay Round texts would introduce into the GATT
dispute process the principle of guaranteed access to a panel, an
element that seems essential both to a private interests system
of justice and to a public interest system that relies on "private
attorneys-general." Certain Tokyo Round "codes" grant a right
to a panel, as do the 1966 special procedures for developing
country complaints. 2 s In Article XXIII:2 proceedings, however,
the Council must establish each panel, and since it operates by
125. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, Dispute Settlement, sec.
F(b); Understanding, supra note 80, at 292, sec. D:2.
126. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, Dispute Settlement, sec.
F(c)(5); Understanding, supra note 80, at 292, sec. D:3(e).
127. Understanding, supra note 80, at 292, sec. D:3(a).
128. See Procedures Under Article XXIII, supra note 92, para. 5.
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consensus, respondents at least formally have the power to pre-
vent the creation of panels. 29 In practice, complainants have ac-
cess to a panel in virtually every case, but respondents can still
cause delay or use their blocking power to improve their position
in settlement negotiations. 30
Previous GATT rounds have not interfered with this power;
indeed negotiators in the Tokyo Round sought to reinforce it, at
the same time attemping to discourage the filing of controversial
complailnts. As with the rules encouraging settlement, the aim
was to avoid confrontations over final decisions that might fa-
tally weaken GATT by keeping troublesome cases out of the sys-
tem altogether. 3'
Against this background, the Uruguay Round provisions are
quite remarkable. The Midterm agreement is somewhat ambigu-
ous on this issue,'32 but the Understanding is clear: on request, a
panel "shall be established" by the second Council meeting at
which the matter appears on the agenda - or even, under an
alternative formulation, at the first such meeting - unless the
Council decides otherwise."3 The latter clause appears at first to
take away what the rest of the text has given. The provision as a
whole, however, creates a presumption in favor of establishment:
the Council must affirmatively act to prevent creation of a panel.
The Understanding includes several bracketed formulations
of the action necessary to overcome the new presumption. In
general, however, the Understanding preserves the principle of
consensus decision making, so formulations that simply refer to
a Council decision would seem to require a consensus against the
creation of a panel; 3 4 one bracketed alternative would make this
requirement explicit. Since the complainant would rarely join
such a consensus - perhaps only if its own demands had been
fully met - it appears that the Uruguay Round texts would in
effect create an automatic right to a panel. The fate of this pro-
vision is, however, in some doubt, for its adoption depends on
satisfactory results in the substantive negotiations of the
129. See Plank, supra note 35, at 63-64.
130. See Plank, supra note 35, at 63-64.
131. See Hudec, Unfinished Business, supra note 7.
132. See Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, Dispute Settlement,
sec. F(a).
133. Understanding, supra note 80, at 291, sec. D:A.
134. Understanding, supra note 80, at 290, sec. A:6.
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Round.135
c) Adoption of Panel Reports
A similar analysis applies to the last phase of the panel pro-
cess, the adoption of panel reports. Panel decisions only have
legal effect after they are adopted by the Council. Before adop-
tion, they are merely advisory, designed to "assist the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES in discharging their responsibilities
under Article XXIII:2."' 1 6 Moreover, as with the establishment
of panels, the Council has adopted panel reports by consensus. 1' 7
Formally, then, each party to a panel proceeding, even the loser,
has had the power to block adoption of an adverse report.
In practice, panel reports have usually been approved, 38
and the GATT contracting parties have agreed that "obstruc-
tion" of the dispute settlement process should be avoided.139 On
occasion, though, losing parties have blocked reports - at least
temporarily, - have delayed their adoption, and have used
these formal powers to negotiate more favorable settlements. 40
Even though the Council is entitled to act by majority vote, 4' it
has been reluctant to interfere. One reason is the continued im-
portance of the consensus principle to autonomy-minded states.
Another, though, has been the desire to retain a safety valve for
dealing with highly controversial decisions.
Here, too, the Uruguay Round texts would work a remarka-
ble change, one which this observer, at least, did not expect to
see emerging from the Round. The Midterm agreement retains
the consensus principle, with the proviso that delay should be
avoided.142 The Understanding, however, parallel to its treat-
ment of establishment, reverses the current presumption, pro-
viding that panel reports "shall be adopted" within sixty days of
issuance, unless the Council decides otherwise. 143 Alternative
135. See Status of Uruguay Round Negotiating Groups of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, Reported by Trade Negotiations Committee of GATT Secretariat,
Nov. 7, 1991, reprinted in 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1670, 1673 (1991).
136. Understanding Regarding Notification, supra note 28, para. 16.
137. See Dispute Settlement Procedures, supra note 28, para. (x).
138. See Hudec, Reforming GATT, supra note 28, at 1489.
139. Dispute Settlement Procedures, supra note 28, para. (x).
140. See Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution, supra note 12.
141. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 36, art. XXV:4.
142. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, Dispute Settlement, sec.
G.
143. Understanding, supra note 80, at 296, sec. G:4. The provision protects the right
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formulations of the required Council vote are similar to those in
the establishment provision. In this case too, a consensus deci-
sion against adoption would appear to be necessary.
This reform would be a watershed for GATT. It would
make the panel process a more legitimate device for resolving
private conflicts, while advancing its evolution into a public in-
terest system of justice. Adoption of this reform is linked, how-
ever, not only to the substantive negotiations of the Round, but
also to the abandonment of unilateral trade measures like sec-
tion 301 and its variants in United States law. As this is written,
the likelihood of such a tradeoff is speculative at best. Within
the United States, at least, many industries and other organized
groups see the threat of unilateral measures as a more effective
way to pursue private interests than any form of GATT dispute
proceeding.1 4 4
d) Interim Reports
The Understanding would blur the distinction between the
argumentative phase of a dispute proceeding and the subsequent
deliberations of the panel. It would first require panels, after the
conclusion of arguments, to submit to the parties for written
comment the descriptive portion of their draft reports, which
summarize the facts and the parties' arguments. It would then
require panels to submit to the parties, as "interim reports,"
complete drafts of their decisions, including the findings and
conclusions. 45 Parties could submit additional comments and
request reconsideration of particular issues. On request, panels
would be required to meet with the parties to discuss such is-
sues. Panels would have to take account, in their final decisions,
of the parties to the dispute and all other contracting parties to participate in discussion
of the report. Id., sec. G:3.
144. United States firms have come to rely on section 301, codified at 19 U.S.C. §
2411 (1991), as a more effective means of opening foreign markets than either GATT
negotiations or GATT dispute proceedings. See J. Michael Finger, That Old GATT
Magic No More Casts Its Spell (How the Uruguay Round Failed), 25 J. WORLD TRADE,
No. 2, at 19 (1991).
If the current provisions do emerge from the Round intact, the major concern will be
whether the safety valve of a possible consensus vote against adoption will be sufficient
for current conditions. In the case of a decision strongly opposed by a powerful con-
tracting party, one wonders whether GATT's political cohesion is such that the rule can
be enforced without damaging confrontations. See Abbott, The Uruguay Round and
Dispute Resolution, supra note 12.
145. See Understanding, supra note 80, at 293, sec. D:5.
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of any points raised at the interim review stage. 46 This provi-
sion was proposed by Canada, based on a similar procedure in
the United States-Canada free trade agreement, and received
wide support.147
The interim review proposal plays a fascinating role in the
reform of the panel process contemplated by the Uruguay
Round texts. In part, the procedure simply reflects the pervasive
private interests thinking that underlies that reform: since
panels exist only to deal with the parties' needs, not to perform
any independent function, the parties should have as much lati-
tude as necessary to ensure that panels are properly considering
their arguments. 4" But a more convincing rationale also exists.
The Uruguay Round reforms would create a stronger and
more independent panel process. 4 ' The complainant's right to a
panel and the quasi-automatic adoption of panel reports have
already been discussed; other proposals attempt to strengthen
enforcement.'50 To make these reforms more acceptable to au-
tonomy-minded states, the Uruguay Round negotiators have
sought to give parties to dispute settlement proceedings every
possible opportunity to present their cases in a favorable light,
even if the resulting procedures would be frowned upon in a
well-developed national system.
Similarly, the negotiators have sought to minimize conflict
over actual panel decisions by eliminating as many potential
grounds for objection, both procedural and substantive, as possi-
ble.'5  The interim review procedure, for example, seems in-
tended to estop losing parties from arguing that the panel pro-
cess was unfair or that panels did not properly assess significant
arguments.'52
146. See Understanding, supra note 80,,at 293, sec. D:5.
147. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Uruguay Round Negotiations 1986-1991,
[hereinafter Petersmann, The Uruguay Round Negotiations], in THE NEW GATT
ROUND, supra note 8, at 501, 554.
148. A similar procedure in the 1979 Agreed Description of dispute settlement prac-
tice aimed to provide one last chance for the parties to settle their dispute. See Agreed
Description, supra note 28, para. 6(vii). The settlement motivation is not mentioned in
the Uruguay Round texts, however.
149. The settlement, mediation and arbitration provisions run counter to this trend.
This is why those provisions are both surprising and disturbing.
150. See infra part III(B)(6).
151. See Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution, supra note 12.
152. The present procedure - in which the descriptive portion of the draft report is
circulated to the parties for comment - allows parties to object that the panel did not
consider certain arguments, since a summary of the arguments made is included in the
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From the perspective of an affirmative private interests
community, the major risk of the interim review procedure is
interference, actual or perceived, with the independence of the
panel.153 Pierre Pescatore, a former judge on the European
Court of Justice and a panelist in several GATT cases, strongly
criticizes the procedure on this ground. He writes: "[tihe 'in-
terim review' would constitute an outright intervention into the
panel's independence. It would allow the parties to give preven-
tive warnings and to exert pointed pressures on the panel mem-
bers." 15 4 The Understanding attempts to minimize these dan-
gers: all parties would participate in additional meetings with
the panel, for example, and ex parte communications would be
wholly forbidden.5 5 Still, the risk of interference cannot be
discounted.
From a public interest perspective, the interim review pro-
cedure is even more troubling. Dispute settlement proceedings,
even privately initiated proceedings involving private disputes,
may implicate interests of the community beyond those of the
parties themselves. Dispute procedures should be designed to
ensure that decisions are made with these interests in mind.
Thus, for example, while the right of a single state to block es-
tablishment of a panel or adoption of a panel decision elevates
private interests above any possible community interest in the
outcome, the reforms proposed in the Uruguay Round would al-
low the ordinary procedures to go forward unless the community
decided otherwise." 6
In this context, the interim review proposal seems somewhat
retrograde: by permitting party intrusion into the decision mak-
ing of the panel, it harks back to a vision of dispute proceedings
as involving only the private interests of the parties. In Judge
Pescatore's words, the interim review process is "incompatible
with the multilateral character of the panel procedure, which is
there to resolve disputes on the basis of GATT law, in the com-
mon interest, and not according to the sole interests of the par-
description. That procedure may even have been used to raise new arguments after the
formal deadline for submission had passed. See Lowenfeld, supra note 60, at xv.
153. Neutrality is among the highest values in a private interests system of justice.
See supra text accompanying note 22.
154. Letter from Pierre Pescatore to the author (May 28, 1991) (on file with the
author) [hereinafter Correspondence].
155. Understanding, supra note 80, at 297, see. I.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33, 142-43.
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ties to a given dispute.' 57 The procedure seems more suitable
for a bilateral arrangement, like the United States-Canada
agreement that inspired it, where there are few if any "commu-
nity" interests separate from the interests of the parties.
Given the current attitudes of the contracting parties, the
private interests justifications for the interim review procedure
are certain to prevail, and, on the whole, are persuasive. As
GATT dispute procedures evolve toward a public interest sys-
tem, however, the procedure should be reexamined.
5. Appeal
The Understanding proposes the establishment of an en-
tirely new institution within GATT, a "standing appellate
body," empowered to hear appeals from panel rulings before
they are considered by the Council. 58 The appellate body could
uphold, modify, or reverse the legal rulings of the panel below.' 59
Its decisions would have to go to the Council, but they would be
dealt with there under the same presumption of approval that
would apply to panel reports. If approved, moreover, decisions
would be "unconditionally accepted" by the parties to the
dispute.'60
Like panels themselves,' 6 ' the appellate body is designed to
function within a regime of privately-initiated, private interest
proceedings. Only a party to a pending dispute, not a state with
a general interest in the rule under consideration or any other
third party, could appeal. Indeed, unlike the panel process, 62
only parties to the dispute could participate in appellate pro-
ceedings.6 3 Proceedings would be limited to issues of law and
legal interpretation dealt with by the panel below,16 4 but all such
issues raised by the parties would have to be addressed by the
appellate body. 6 5
In terms of its structure, the proposed appellate body would
157. Correspondence, supra note 154.
158. Understanding, supra note 80, at 296, sec. H:l.
159. Understanding, supra note 80, at 297, sec. H:2(d).
160. Understanding, supra note 80, at 297, sec. H:3.
161. See supra text accompanying note 124.
162. Contracting parties not involved in a particular dispute may nonetheless par-
ticipate in a panel proceeding if they have a "substantial interest in a matter before a
panel." Understanding, supra note 80, at 295, sec. E:2.
163. Understanding, supra note 80, at 297, sec. H:1(d).
164. Understanding, supra note 80, at 297, sec. H:l(f).
165. Understanding, supra note 80, at 297, sec. H:2(c).
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be almost ideally suited to a private interests system of jus-
tice.""6 It would be composed of seven members, selected by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES for fixed, four year terms. 16 7 Mem-
bers would be "persons of recognized authority, with demon-
strated expertise in law, international trade and GATT matters
generally," and would not be affiliated with any government.'6 8
Three members, serving in rotation, would hear each appeal. A
member could not hear a case that created a direct or indirect
conflict of interest. The body would be provided with legal and
administrative staff."6 9 If implemented in practice, these features
should guarantee a substantial measure of neutrality, indepen-
dence, and expertise.
By the same token, the appellate body would be better
structured than virtually any other entity in the GATT system
to operate as a public institution, both in the short term and as
the public elements of GATT continue to develop. Most impor-
tant, the appellate body would be independent of private na-
tional interests to a greater degree than any other dispute reso-
lution institution: working groups, Article XXIII panels, ad hoc
arbitral tribunals, or the Council itself. The structure of the ap-
pellate body should also produce an institutional commitment to
the furtherance of community policy. 70 In particular, its mem-
bers would be selected for expertise in GATT law and affairs,
and their only function would be the authoritative determina-
tion of GATT law.17 '
166. A private-interests community would demand neutral and independent institu-
tions of justice, see supra text accompanying note 22, expert decision-makers to clarify
norms, and finality in the processing of disputes, to aid private ordering. See Abbott,
The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution, supra note 12.
167. Understanding, supra note 80, at 296, sec. H:1.
168. This is in contrast to members of panels, most of whom have been currently
serving trade diplomats, although panel members are expected to act independently. See
Plank, supra note 35, at 65.
There could be some difficulty in finding enough fully qualified persons who are
willing to serve on the appellate body. Willingness to serve will turn in part on such
matters as compensation and working conditions. Much remains to be done here: the
Understanding does not even specify, for example, whether the members of the body
would serve full-time.
169. The European Community has urged that the staff of the appellate body be
wholly separate from the Secretariat, since the Secretariat, especially its Legal Service,
will continue to have a substantial role in advising panels. See GATT, News of the Uru-
guay Round, No. 35, April 19, 1990.
170. Compare the discussion of the structure of arbitral tribunals, supra text accom-
panying notes 111-13.
171. Another "public" feature seems somewhat less appropriate: members of the
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Within the predominantly private interests orientation of
the Uruguay Round texts, the principal justifications for a new
appellate procedure seem to be, as in the case of interim review,
the perceived needs to defuse opposition to the strengthening of
the panel process and to minimize conflict over actual deci-
sions.17 2 Initially, the right to appeal to a neutral, independent,
and expert institution should make a stronger panel process
seem less threatening to state autonomy. Following a decision,
the right to appeal, whether exercised or not, should make it
more difficult for the losing party to challenge the procedural
fairness or the legal correctness of the decison.
An appellate procedure might also serve public functions.
Most important, it should strengthen GATT law in several ways:
first, by helping to clarify it; second, by applying it in a highly
visible fashion, thereby helping to educate the community as to
its content and normative force; and third, by lending its own
legitimacy to community norms and rules. 73 Institutionally, ef-
fective appellate review should increase respect for the GATT
legal system, even while making a stronger system more accept-
able to states.
Appellate review alone, however, will not necessarily pro-
duce decisions that are substantively more acceptable. Many ar-
guments as to the "correctness" of panel decisions do not turn
on objective matters of legal craft that can be rectified by a more
expert or independent decision-maker, but rather stem from
deeper disagreements over the nature of GATT law, perhaps
even of law in general. Some of these disagreements reflect a
conflict between the public interest and private interests
perspectives.
For example, while the Understanding notes that dispute
proceedings serve to clarify the rules of the General Agreement,
it immediately attaches the proviso that "recommendations and
rulings under Article XXIII cannot add to or diminish the rights
and obligations provided in the General Agreement."' 4 This
body would be chosen so as to be "broadly representative of membership in GATT."
Understanding, supra note 80, at 296, sec. H:1(c). This requirement might be desirable
in a legislative institution, but in a judicial body it could conflict with the desire for
expertise.
172. For a discussion of this rationale in the context of the interim review proposal,
see supra text accompanying notes 149-52.
173. For a discussion of similar issues in the context of arbitration, see supra text
accompanying notes 119-23.
174. Understanding, supra note 80, at 289, sec. A:2.
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proviso seems to reflect a fear that panels, or the appellate body,
may act to implement what they perceive to be the purpose be-
hind the rules, the spirit of the General Agreement, or some
other indicia of community policy, rather than enforcing only
those precise obligations to which the contracting parties have
agreed on the basis of reciprocity. Many decision-makers, how-
ever, would consider it quite appropriate to interpret GATT
rules in light of broader community policy, at least in difficult
cases. Even the Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties,
whose approach to interpretation is often followed by GATT
panels, permits inquiry into the object and purpose of a treaty
provision and the circumstances of its origin. 175 Philosophical
conflicts like these may be inevitable, and will not be resolved by
procedural solutions like appellate review.176
6. Implementation
The Uruguay Round texts attempt to deal with one of the
most significant problems in GATT, the failure to comply with
dispute settlement decisions. 17" As both texts declare, "Prompt
compliance .. .is essential in order to ensure effective resolu-
tion of disputes to the benefit of all contracting parties. '1 78 This
emphasis on the general benefits of compliance is justified from
both the private interests and the public interest perspective.
While their precise goals may vary, both approaches recognize
that noncompliance can weaken community rules, potentially
undermining the entire legal system.
Both texts seek to improve compliance by strengthening the
rather flexible surveillance system 7" under which the Council
175. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31-32, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679.
176. As noted earlier, see supra part III.B.I., the proviso also seems to reflect a
naive view of interpretation. Even in as conservative a legal system as GATT the process
of applying rules to varying fact situations will inevitably elaborate on the original texts
- this is a principal reason why a dispute process is needed.
177. The Director-General of GATT has repeatedly drawn attention to the problem
of implementation. In November 1991, for example, he warned the Council that GATT
faces an "increasing problem of conditional and incomplete implementation of panel re-
ports," and urged the major contracting parties - by far the heaviest users of the dis-
pute settlement system - to "face up to this important issue." GATT, FOCUS, No. 86
(Nov.-Dec. 1991) at 1.
178. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, Dispute Settlement, sec.
1:1; Understanding, supra note 80, at 298, sec. K:1.
179. The Tokyo Round Understanding - the title of which includes "surveillance"
along with "dispute settlement" - provides that the CONTRACTING PARTIES (typi-
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has monitored implementation of its rulings."' 0 First, the losing
party would be permitted a "reasonable period" of time to com-
ply with a Council decision. This period, however, would be
specified and approved at the outset."' 1 Second, the issue of im-
plementation would automatically be placed on the Council's
agenda six months after the decision, unless the Council decided
otherwise, and it would remain there until implementation was
complete. The losing party would be required to report on its
progress in implementation at each Council meeting during that
period. Finally, in recognition of the fact that dispute settlement
decisions affect the entire community, any contracting party, not
just the original complainant, would be permitted to raise ques-
tions about implementation at any time. 82
These reforms would give the Council an increasingly im-
portant public role, not only as a forum for the airing of individ-
ual contracting parties' concerns about implementation, but also
as a proto-executive with an independent obligation to supervise
compliance. Although the Council would have no actual enforce-
ment power, the expanded surveillance system should help focus
the community pressures that are the main inducement to
compliance.183
cally the Council) are to keep under surveillance any matter on which they have given a
ruling. If implementation has not taken place within a reasonable time, the original com-
plainant may ask the Council to "make suitable efforts with a view to finding an appro-
priate solution." Understanding Regarding Notification, supra note 28, para. 22. The
1982 Ministerial Declaration on dispute settlement called for periodic Council review
and required the losing party to report on the actions taken or its reasons for not com-
plying. Ministerial Declaration, supra note 28, para. (viii).
180. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, Dispute Settlement, sec.
1:3; Understanding, supra note 80, at 299, sec. K:5.
181. By the terms of the Understanding, the duration of the "reasonable period"
would have to be either (a) proposed by the losing party and approved by the Council,
(b) agreed to by the other parties to the dispute, or (c) determined through binding
arbitration. Understanding, supra note 80, at 298, sec. K:2. These alternatives mix pri-
vate and public interest approaches. Alternative (b), for example, would be dominated
by the victorious party's concern to terminate the offending conduct and the losing
party's difficulties with implementation. Alternative (a), on the other hand, would allow
the Council to consider the community interest as well as the interests of the parties.
Alternative (c) could take either of these approaches.
182. Questions as to whether measures taken by the losing party amounted to com-
pliance would be resolved through the panel process, by reconvening the original panel
whenever possible. Understanding, supra note 80, at 299, sec. K:4.
183. To provide an even stronger normative basis for community pressure, the Un-
derstanding proposes - under the heading of "strengthening the multilateral system" -
a separate statement of commitment to abide by rulings of the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES. Understanding, supra note 80, at 301, sec. M(ii). This commitment, along with
support for a right to a panel, quasi-automatic adoption of panel and appellate body
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These pressures would also be supplemented under the Un-
derstanding by a threat of economic pressure more credible than
at any time in the past. If the losing party had not complied
within the approved period, it would first be required to negoti-
ate with the other parties to the dispute for temporary compen-
sation. If no agreement were reached, any party to the dispute
could request the Council to authorize the temporary suspension
of concessions or other obligations under the General Agreement
until the losing party had complied.18 4
Retaliatory measures are contemplated in Article XXIII
only as a last resort in serious cases.185 In practice, they have
almost never been authorized. On both counts, the Understand-
ing would produce something of a revolution. It provides that
the Council "shall grant authorization" for the temporary sus-
pension of concessions on request, unless it decides otherwise,
apparently by consensus."' s In other words, the same presump-
tion of approval that would lead to quasi-automatic adoption of
panel and appellate body reports would also apply to requests
for authority to retaliate under Article XXIII.
Compensation and retaliation are, in essence, private inter-
ests measures. Both involve the adjustment of relations between
contracting parties, rather than those between the losing party
and institutions representing the community. Both are often jus-
tified as restoring balance between the affected parties, 187
though compensation, which is trade-creating, is generally seen
as preferable. In spite of their horizontal nature, though, com-
pensation and retaliation can be rationalized from a public in-
terest perspective 8 as quasi-sanctions, since they impose costs
reports, and the use of retaliatory measures in cases of noncompliance, is explicitly tied
to another proposed commitment: not to threaten or resort to unilateral trade measures
inconsistent with GATT rules and procedures. Id. sec. M(iii). See also supra note 1. The
latter commitment is aimed primarily at the United States and its section 301 procedure.
It is unclear as this is written whether such a commitment will be acceptable to those
forces in the United States that support the use of section 301 to open foreign markets.
See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
184. Understanding, supra note 80, at 299, secs. L:1-2.
185. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 36, art. XXIII:2. The seri-
ousness with which such measures were regarded is indicated by the provision authoriz-
ing states against which retaliation is taken to withdraw from GATT on 60 days notice.
Id.
186. Understanding, supra note 80, at 300, sec. L:3.
187. See supra text accompanying note 37.
188. An affirmative private interests community might share this perspective to the
extent it is concerned to maintain the basic rules that keep order in society.
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on parties that fail to comply. The threat of such sanctions can
be seen as a community inducement to compliance.
Compensation, even if mandatory, is a limited inducement,
since, by definition, it is measured by the injury to the com-
plainants, not by the damage to community interests or the
amount needed to induce compliance with community norms.
Retaliation, though, need not suffer from the same limitations.
Article XXIII, in fact, does not require that retaliatory measures
be limited by the complainants' injury,"8 9 and neither does the
draft Understanding.'9" If temporary retaliation comes to be
more frequently utilized under the Uruguay Round texts, GATT
may soon be faced with the possibility - a daunting one to be
sure, given past practice - of utilizing retaliation as a true com-
munity sanction: authorizing the suspension of concessions by
however many contracting parties and in whatever amounts are
thought necessary to induce compliance or to punish bad faith.
The danger, of course - as in other efforts to strengthen
GATT dispute procedures' 9 ' - is that the actual authorization
of retaliation, even in "compensatory" amounts, could set off a
confrontation that would severely weaken GATT, perhaps even
leading to the withdrawal of contracting parties. With this risk
presumably in mind, the Understanding provides one last ave-
nue of escape: retaliation would be terminated, even without full
compliance, if the parties to the dispute reached a settlement or
if the losing party provided a "solution" to the complainant's
private injury. 92
These alternatives tend to return retaliation to the domain
of private interests. Any settlements reached would have to be
consistent with the General Agreement,'93 but a losing party
might still be able to avoid actually complying with community
norms, perhaps weakening them in the long run.9 4 In time, one
would hope that the idea of compliance would not have to be
compromised in this way. For the present, however, the risk
189. See JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 352 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter JACKSON & DAVEY].
190. See Understanding, supra note 80, at 300, secs. L:3-5 (amount of trade covered
by suspension of concessions shall be "appropriate in the circumstances"; disagreements
as to amount shall be resolved by arbitration).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 90, 104, 131, 141, 149-52 and 172.
192. Understanding, supra note 80, at 300, sec. L:6.
193. Understanding, supra note 80, at 289, sec. A:3.
194. See supra discussion of procedures for supervision of settlements accompany-
ing notes 101-03.
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must have seemed too great.195 Even so, the Understanding's
provisions on implementation go further than almost anyone
expected.
C. Functioning of the GATT System (FOGS)
The principal accomplishment of the FOGS negotiations 9 '
has been to strengthen the norms and procedures by which
GATT exercises surveillance over the trade policies and prac-
tices of the contracting parties.19 7 Various GATT institutions -
the Council, the Committee on Balance-of-Payment Restric-
tions, the committees of various Tokyo Round codes, and others
- have monitored national policies for some time. 98 By the
time of the Uruguay Round, however, many observers felt that
more effective surveillance was needed.
One influential, public-oriented recommendation came from
the advisory "group of eminent persons" appointed by the Di-
rector-General in 1983. That group urged that GATT monitor
national policies and measures "as watchdog . . . on behalf of
the trading system as a whole," and suggested several surveil-
lance procedures. 99 Enhancing surveillance was established as a
goal for the Uruguay Round in the Ministerial Declaration.0 0
Indeed, in an unprecedented step, the Declaration established a
195. For a suggestion that the Uruguay Round negotiators consider adding a "politi-
cal filter" for cases that threaten GATT's cohesion as a community, see Abbott, The
Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution, supra note 12.
196. In addition to the procedures discussed in this section, the Midterm Review
decisions adopted a FOGS group recommendation that the CONTRACTING PARTIES
meet at the level of trade ministers at least every two years, in order to give greater
political direction to GATT's work and to help reinforce national commitments to
GATT, in part by giving it greater prominence. See Midterm Review Agreements, supra
note 67, Part I, FOGS, sec. 5. See also FOGS Draft Decision, supra note 3, at 323, sec. 7.
The content of these meetings and the approach to trade problems to be taken by the
ministers are not, and cannot be, defined in these decisions. It is at least possible,
though, that such regular meetings will contribute to a sense of community and thus lead
to a greater emphasis on common interests in the work of GATT.
The FOGS group also produced some rather general recommendations on coordina-
tion of the work of GATT with other international economic organizations, notably the
IMF and World Bank. See Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, FOGS,
see. 6; FOGS Draft Decision, supra note 3, at 324-25, secs. 9-13.
197. For an analysis of surveillance activities in GATT and other international eco-
nomic organizations see Richard Blackhurst, Strengthening GATT Surveillance of
Trade-Related Policies, in Tim NEw GATT ROUND, supra note 8 [hereinafter
Blackhurst].
198. Blackhurst, supra note 197, at 131-35.
199. GATT, TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE, supra note 56, at 42.
200. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, supra note 34, Part I:E(i).
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surveillance system to operate during the Round itself.210
Multilateral surveillance depends on measures that increase
the transparency of national policies and practices. One such
measure, an improved notification system, was proposed in the
draft FOGS decision appended to the 1990 Draft Final Act.202
The contracting parties would first reaffirm their existing obliga-
tions as to the publication of national measures and their notifi-
cation to GATT.203 Many specific obligations of this sort are
contained in the General Agreement, and the Tokyo Round un-
derstanding on notification added a more general, though not le-
gally binding obligation to notify, in advance whenever possible,
the adoption of any trade measures that might affect the opera-
tion of GATT." 4
The draft FOGS decision would strengthen these obliga-
tions in several ways. First, it would add a lengthy "indicative
list" of the types of measures that should be notified. 0 5 Second,
it would create a central registry of notifications, maintained by
the Secretariat. This would function as a source of information
to other contracting parties, and would also have more active,
public interest functions. Registry officials would be required to
remind each contracting party, each year, of the notification ob-
ligations to which it is subject. They would also be required to
bring delays and failures in notification to the attention of the
delinquent states.20 6 Finally, the draft FOGS decision proposes a
complete review of notification obligations, to minimize the bur-
den they impose while further improving compliance.0
The most significant element in the enhanced surveillance
program is the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), under
which GATT periodically monitors, in considerable detail, the
trade policies and practices of individual contracting parties.
The details of the TPRM were worked out by the time of the
Midterm Review, 208 and the mechanism was put into effect pro-
visionally after adoption by the Trade Negotiations Commit-
201. See Blackhurst, supra note 197, at 123, 134.
202. FOGS Draft Decision, supra note 3, at 321-23, sec. 6.
203. FOGS Draft Decision, supra note 3, at 322, sec. 6:1.
204. Understanding Regarding Notification, supra note 28, para. 2-3.
205. FOGS Draft Decision, supra note 3, at 322, sec. 6:1 and Indicative List of No-
tifiable Measures, annexed thereto.
206. FOGS Draft Decision, supra note 3, at 322, sec. 6:11.
207. FOGS Draft Decision, supra note 3, at 322, sec. 6:111.
208. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, FOGS, sec. 4.
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tee.209 On the basis of experience with the TPRM during the
next year and a half, the 1990 draft FOGS decision recom-
mended that the mechanism be confirmed without change as
part of the final Uruguay Round package.210
The TPRM may be the clearest example of public interest
thinking to emerge from the Round. Although it does not entail
a delegation of significant power, it makes inroads on the auton-
omy of the contracting parties, the institutional weakness of
GATT, and, to a limited extent, the horizontal nature of dispute
settlement and enforcement.
On the first point, the TPRM enables community institu-
tions to make a "regular collective ... evaluation" of the trade
policies of the contracting parties from the perspective of their
impact on the multilateral trading system.211 Each contracting
party is required to submit a full description of its policies and
practices each year in which it is subject to review. In other
years, it must report on significant changes and provide statisti-
cal updates. 2 2 The frequency of review is determined by a coun-
try's impact on the trading system, measured by its share of
world trade. The largest countries, including the United States
and the European Communities, are reviewed every two years.2 13
The institutional procedures of the TPRM emphasize its
collective character.21 4 Reviews are conducted by the Council,
acting as the "review body," at special meetings. Council consid-
eration is based not only on the reports submitted in advance by
the state under review, but on an independent report provided
by the Secretariat. The Secretariat is both authorized and en-
couraged to seek clarifying information from the contracting
party under review. In consultation with that state, the Chair of
the Council selects several persons to act as discussants at the
review meeting. The discussants, acting in their personal capac-
ity, not as representatives of other contracting parties, help fo-
cus the Council's deliberations.
Finally, the TPRM is conceived as a way to contribute to
209. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, FOGS, sec. 4:E.
210. FOGS Draft Decision, supra note 3, at 321, secs. 1-2. The draft decision pro-
vides, however, that the TPRM is to be reviewed again not later than October 1992. Id.
sec. 3.
211. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, FOGS, sec. 4:A(ii).
212. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, FOGS, sec. 4:B.
213. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, FOGS, sec. 4:C(i).
214. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, FOGS, sec. 4:D.
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greater compliance with GATT rules, commitments, and disci-
plines. 215 The mechanism is supplemented by an annual Council
review of the trading environment, including the major policy
issues facing the GATT community, based on a report by the
Director-General. This "enhanced surveillance" program is
designed to function as an "early warning" system for the spe-
cial Council meetings.
216
The draft FOGS decision carefully forecloses, however, what
would seem to be the natural next step, at least from a public-
interest perspective: using the TPRM as a basis for the initia-
tion of dispute proceedings or other forms of enforcement ac-
tion.217 This limitation means that the GATT dispute settlement
system will continue to rely on privately initiated, private inter-
est proceedings, and will be the only formal means of enforcing
community norms. The TPRM's role in improving compliance
will be limited to marshalling community opinion through dis-
cussions in the Council and the publication of reports and pro-
ceedings from country reviews.21 s
Even with its limitations, the work of the FOGS group in
enhancing multilateral surveillance represents a significant ex-
tension of the public interest attitudes and practices that have
slowly been developing within GATT.219 It clearly signals the di-
rection in which GATT should continue to evolve.
IV. THE FUTURE OF GATT AS A PUBLIC INSTITUTION
Even before the Uruguay Round, the institutions of GATT
had begun to develop some attributes of a public interest com-
munity.22 0 As noted in the previous section, the Round itself
may advance that evolution in a variety of ways.2 2' This section
suggests a number of directions for post-Uruguay Round institu-
215. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, FOGS, sec. 4:A(i).
216. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, FOGS, sec. 4:F. The
TPRM and the annual overviews together replace the far more general agreement of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES, set out in the Tokyo Round Understanding, to conduct "a
regular and systematic review of developments in the trading system." Understanding
Regarding Notification, supra note 28, para. 24.
The enhanced surveillance program, especially its early warning aspect, should also
contribute to more substantial ministerial meetings. See supra note 196.
217. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, FOGS, sec. 4:A(i).
218. Midterm Review Agreements, supra note 67, Part I, FOGS, sec. 4:D(v).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 56-67.
221. See supra text part III.
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tional development that are suggested by the public interest
model. Unlike the extreme vision of the activist state, however,
the suggestions put forward here are intended to be moderate.
They contemplate arrangements that would help GATT perform
its public role as "guarantor of the open and non-discriminatory
trading system" 2 2 while continuing to respect state autonomy.
Realization of such suggestions will depend, of course, on
the continued evolution of fundamental political attitudes. The
contracting parties of GATT must continue to recognize that
there exists a community of trading nations with common goals
and interests worthy of implementation, and must be willing to
accept the constraints on freedom of action implicit in the oper-
ation of community institutions.223 There is no guarantee that
the necessary attitudes will develop. Indeed, at present even the
strong private interests dispute procedures proposed in the Un-
derstanding may be hard for some contracting parties to
accept.2
24
It is nonetheless worthwhile to sketch the institutional im-
plications of the public interest model. For those already recep-
tive to an expanded public role for GATT, the ideas put forward
here may suggest the outlines of a post-Uruguay Round institu-
tional agenda. For others, these ideas may suggest the possibili-
ties inherent in the model, thus making it more attractive.
Above all, I hope these ideas will stimulate further study, for
much work will be needed to refine suggestions like those offered
here into practical alternatives for GATT.
A. Dispute Procedures
1. Settlement
Two changes in the procedures governing settlement of dis-
putes seem essential. First, as others have also recommended, 225
community dispute resolution institutions, especially Article
XXIII panels, should not be charged with encouraging settle-
ment. There are certainly situations in which settlement might
properly be encouraged. Examples might include disputes in-
volving only private interests and proceedings that would im-
222. See supra text accompanying note 69.
223. Cf. GATT, TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE, supra note 56, at 33-34.
224. See Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution, supra note 12.
225. See Hilf, supra note 8, at 314; JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note
27, at 111.
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pose an institutional burden out of proportion to their impor-
tance. Even here, though, the task is more appropriately carried
out by the Director-General or his designee. When disputes in-
volving significant community interests enter the Article XXIII
process, no GATT institution should be obliged to promote set-
tlement. From a community perspective, the real concern in
such cases is the control of settlements, not their
encouragement.226
The second essential reform, then, is the development of
stronger procedures for supervising settlements reached during
litigation. For example, the Director-General could be charged
with monitoring settlement negotiations to help ensure that
community norms were taken into account. Proposed settle-
ments might be subjected to an initial review by a nonpolitical
entity charged with protecting the community interest, such as
the pending dispute panel, a special panel, or the appellate
body. If the Council also reviewed settlements, as under the
Uruguay Round proposals,227 the public interest could be in-
jected into the proceedings by allowing the Director-General, the
Legal Service, or some other body to raise objections as repre-
sentatives of the community.
The Council might then be explicitly authorized - at least
in cases involving important community interests, or if recom-
mended by the initial review body - to set aside particular set-
tlements and direct panels to continue their work.228 Such au-
thority should be carefully constrained. On the other hand, to
avoid problems reminiscent of the blocking of panel reports, the
Council should be able to take such action without the concur-
rence of the parties to particular disputes.
2. Arbitration
In the recent United States Supreme Court case Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,229 the parties to
an international distributorship agreement had agreed to arbi-
trate, in Japan, all disputes arising out of their contract. Alleg-
ing breach of contract, Mitsubishi initiated arbitration proceed-
ings and sought an order compelling Soler to appear. Soler
226. See supra text accompanying notes 99-106.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
228. Cf. Hilf, supra note 8, at 315.
229. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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asserted a counterclaim alleging breach of United States anti-
trust law, and sought to exclude this claim from any order com-
pelling arbitration, so that it might be heard in a United States
court. Over a strong dissent, the Court upheld the arbitration of
the antitrust claim. As both sides recognized, the effect of this
decision was to refer to arbitration a claim invoking a major ele-
ment of United States public law, a legal regime of "fundamen-
tal importance to American democratic capitalism. 2 o30 A major
issue was whether private arbitrators were institutionally quali-
fied to protect such important public interests.
The majority and dissenting opinions in Mitsubishi suggest
two major avenues for reconciling the use of arbitration - typi-
cally, and under the Uruguay Round texts, a purely private in-
terests procedure - with the promotion and protection of com-
munity norms and policies. The majority relied on subsequent
judicial review, observing that United States courts would "have
the opportunity at the award enforcement stage to ensure that
the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws
has been addressed."2 31 The dissenters suggested that such re-
view would be ineffective, due in part to the simplified proce-
dures of arbitration. They argued that agreements to arbitrate
claims "for the violation of a public right" should not be en-
forceable in the first instance.2 32
In the GATT context, the more extreme option for recon-
ciling arbitration with community interests, associated with the
dissenters in Mitsubishi, would be to limit the availability of ar-
bitration to cases, or aspects of cases, in which private interests
were dominant, retaining matters of public interest for the panel
process. Early discussions of arbitration in the Uruguay Round
often seemed to assume, in fact, that arbitration should only be
made available for "defined classes of cases," perhaps only for
230. Id. at 634. The majority relied on several grounds, including a general federal
policy favoring arbitration and a series of precedents upholding contractual choices of
law, forum and dispute procedure in international transactions. Id. at 632-40.
231. Id. at 638. The majority noted that the New York Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards authorizes national courts to refuse
enforcement for reasons of public policy. In the majority's view, however, the enforcing
court should in general limit its inquiry to whether the arbitrators had actually consid-
ered and decided the antitrust claim; "substantive review at the award-enforcement
stage [should] remain minimal. . . ." Id.
232. Id. at 666. Enforcement awards need only be sought, of course, when one party
resists arbitration. The dissenters did not suggest that public institutions should inter-
fere with the arbitration of claims involving public rights if no party objects. They did
suggest, though, that federal law does not authorize the arbitration of statutory claims.
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factual disputes, and that the Council should supervise the
kinds of disputes that were submitted to arbitration. 33 Little of
this cautious approach survives in the Uruguay Round texts,'2 3 4
but it should be borne in mind for the future.
The narrower option, associated with the majority, would be
to strengthen the process for reviewing arbitral awards to ensure
their consideration of, and consistency with, community norms.
The first steps in such a process would be to require arbitrators
to apply GATT law, and to maintain complete records and pre-
pare reasoned opinions so that substantive review was possi-
ble.23 5 Beyond that, the kinds of procedures suggested above for
the review of settlements could be adapted to the review of arbi-
tral awards.
Finally, as suggested earlier,236 a third option would be to
structure the arbitral process itself - particularly the choice of
arbitrators - so that arbitral panels could more confidently be
relied upon to take account of, and properly decide, issues of law
and policy important to the GATT community. An ad hoc ver-
sion of this approach also figured in the majority opinion in Mit-
subishi, which noted with approval the legal qualifications of the
Japanese arbitrators selected to hear the case.
3. The Panel Process
Although the Uruguay Round texts would significantly
strengthen it, the GATT panel process would continue to be
structured around the resolution of privately-initiated private
disputes.31 A few aspects of that process, notably the interim
review procedure, should eventually be reformed.238 The primary
goal for the future, however, should be the development of ancil-
233. Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, supra note 100, paras. 81-86. In
addition, it was often asserted that arbitral decisions should not have public effect as
precedents. Id.
234. The arbitration provision in the Understanding does state that arbitration is
appropriate for "certain disputes," but seems to include any dispute where the issues are
clearly defined by the parties. Understanding, supra note 80, at 301, sec. 0:1. The provi-
sion also requires arbitration agreements to be notified to all contracting parties. Id. sec.
0:2. Factual issues relating to the suspension of concessions would be referred to arbitra-
tion. Id. at 300, secs. L:3, 5.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 119-22. In the Mitsubishi case Mitsubishi
conceded that United States antitrust law applied to the counterclaim and represented
that the case had been submitted to the arbitrators on that basis. 473 U.S. 614, 636 n.19.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 111-18.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 153-57.
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lary procedures by which community institutions can directly
assert the community interest when the activities of private liti-
gants may not adequately protect it.
Perhaps the easiest way to approximate this goal would be
to further expand the rules of standing, making it easier for con-
tracting parties not directly affected by a measure at issue in a
particular case to intervene in a dispute proceeding and present
their concerns about similar measures, about asserted interpre-
tations of GATT law, or about the precedential implications of
particular holdings. 39 More broadly, the Leutwiler Report240
points out that "contracting parties that are concerned about
the broader consequences" of particular measures are actually
entitled to initiate dispute proceedings themselves, under a
clause of Article XXIII authorizing complaints against measures
that impede "the attainment of any objective" of the General
Agreement,241 and recommends that contracting parties be en-
couraged to take advantage of this rule.
Both of these approaches, however, share a common flaw. It
will rarely be rational for any contracting party to go to the
trouble and expense 242 of learning about a particular trade mea-
sure, analyzing its "broader consequences," and intervening in a
dispute proceeding, or initiating its own, when the measure does
not affect it directly. The protection and promotion of commu-
nity rules and policies are public goods, in economic terms, and
239. During the Uruguay Round negotiations, Hong Kong proposed that any con-
tracting party should be able to receive the submissions of the litigants in any case and
attend the first substantive hearing. Other states responded that this procedure was un-
necessary, since contracting parties significantly affected by a measure could join the
case as co-complainants. This response, however, takes account only of private interests;
it ignores the possibility that other contracting parties could present issues significant to
the community.
Hong Kong replied with the argument that, if nonparties were to be limited in their
participation, adopted panel reports should only bind the parties to a proceeding. The
response to this assertion was that all contracting parties must be able to rely on author-
itative interpretations of GATT law. The problem remains, however: if panel decisions
are to be public law, someone must be able to assert the public interest. See News of the
Uruguay Round, No. 34, Feb. 23, 1990, at 8-9.
240. GATT, TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE, supra note 56, at 46-47.
241. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 36, art. XXIIII.
Under this clause, it appears, complainants would not have to establish that benefits
accruing to them are being "nullified or impaired" by the challenged measure, as in most
GATT proceedings; status as a contracting party would seem to be the only standing
requirement.
242. The costs are not all monetary- initiating a legal proceeding against a powerful
country could carry significant political risks.
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efforts to provide them on a voluntary, decentralized basis will
inevitably encounter the classic problems of rational ignorance
and free-riding.2 43 Individual nations typically rely on public in-
stitutions to provide important public goods like these, and that
is also the best strategy for GATT.
The most obvious institutional approach would be to ex-
pand upon the present role of the Secretariat as advisor to dis-
pute panels and "guardian of the General Agreement. '2 44 As
Professor Hilf has noted, many institutional models can be
found in national legal systems.245 Secretariat representatives
could, for example, be authorized to appear as amicus curiae
before panels, the appellate body or even the Council in cases
involving a general community interest in the control of certain
measures or the development of certain rules. Alternatively, Sec-
retariat representatives could be empowered to act as advocates-
general, on the model of the European Court of Justice, offering
an objective community perspective in every case.246 Perhaps
even more desirable, a separate advocate-general corps could be
created, allowing the Secretariat itself to continue assisting
panels.
A related approach might focus on further refining the
choice of panelists, making panels more receptive to arguments
on such matters as the long term ramifications of particular
measures, the importance of particular precedents, or the consis-
tency of GATT law. Such an approach might focus on an in-
creased role for the Director-General in the choice of panelists
and increased reliance on nongovernmental panelists, particu-
larly the sort of person envisioned for membership on the appel-
late body.247
Eventually, it might be desirable to grant GATT institu-
tions the power actually to initiate dispute proceedings where
necessary to protect and promote community norms. Such a
243. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospec-
tus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335, 377-79 (1989).
244. See supra text accompanying note 60.
245. Hilf, supra note 8, at 314.
246. See Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, art. 166, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. For a brief
introduction to the advocate-general system, see P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN
THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 145-46 (Laurence
W. Gormley, ed., 2d ed. 1989).
247. For similar suggestions, see GATT, TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE,
supra note 56, at 46-47; Petersmann, Strengthening the GATT, supra note 59, at 324-25;
JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING, supra note 58, at 75.
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move would represent a clear break with the fundamental as-
sumptions of the traditional dispute settlement system. It
would, however, be a logical outgrowth of recent trends in dis-
pute settlement2 4s and of the increasing emphasis on surveil-
lance of national policies.2 49 Public initiation of dispute proceed-
ings might in some cases be difficult to square with the language
of Article XXIII,25 0 but the procedure could be authorized by
the CONTRACTING PARTIES under Article XXV as a means
of "furthering the objectives of [the General] Agreement."2'"
GATT institutions would almost certainly utilize such a
power prudently, constrained by political pressures from the
contracting parties and by limited resources. 52 The power could
be further constrained by the formulation of governing stan-
dards. For example, GATT institutions could be authorized to
initiate proceedings only in situations involving issues of sub-
stantial importance to the community. Their authority could
further be limited to situations in which the potential complain-
ants were unlikely to initiate private proceedings: where, for ex-
ample, they lacked adequate resources, were economically or po-
litically dependent on the states whose measures were in issue,
or had been neutralized by voluntary export restraint agree-
ments or similar arrangements.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 196-219.
250. Article XXIII generally contemplates private initiation, even though the "at-
tainment of any objective" clause suggests that contracting parties may initiate claims
for public purposes, see supra text accompanying note 241. Under article XXIII:1(a)-(b),
the contracting party injured by the actions of another contracting party is envisioned as
initiating consultations with that party and any others it considers to be concerned;
under article XXIII:2, if those private consultations are not successful, the matter "may
be referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES" for investigation.
The use of the passive voice in the latter clause suggests that GATT institutions, as
well as individual contracting parties, could properly refer a "matter" to the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES, initiating a panel proceeding. This provision might, in other
words, be read as parallel to Article 99 of the United Nations Charter, under which the
Secretary-General may bring to the Security Council matters that may threaten interna-
tional peace and security, 1983 Y.B. of the U.N. 1325. The "matter" that may be referred
under article XXIII:2, however, appears to be a private dispute, initiated by a con-
tracting party, as to which private consultations have taken place. See General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 36, art. XXIII:1, art. XXIII:2, first sentence. See
also Plank, supra note 35, at 60-61. Even a "matter" in which "any other situation" is
seen as impeding "the attainment of any objective of the Agreement," under art. XX-
III:1(c), appears to fall under article XXIII only when identified by a contracting party.
251. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 36, art. XXV:1.
252. For a discussion of some of these influences in the context of an earlier GATT
institution, see HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYsTEM, supra note 4, at 285.
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In situations like these, the natural complainants will often
be developing countries.2 53 The need for public action on behalf
of the disadvantaged members of the community, then, provides
an additional justification for public initiation. Not surprisingly,
developing countries have been the most consistent advocates of
such a procedure. Brazil and Uruguay unsuccesfully sought to
provide for Secretariat initiation of dispute proceedings in Part
IV of the General Agreement, dealing with trade and develop-
ment.254 Similar proposals were advanced in 1965; though again
unsuccessful, they influenced the 1966 decision255 establishing
special procedures for developing country complaints, including
the right to a panel and fixed time limits. 25 6 Without public ini-
tiation, however, this procedure has had little effect.257
In 1967 and 1970, the CONTRACTING PARTIES actually
agreed to establish two largely automatic panel procedures, to
review, respectively, quantitative restrictions on industrial prod-
ucts2 8 and developed country compliance with Part IV259,
though neither was in any way effective. In 1971, still pressed by
the developing countries, GATT created the Group of Three -
consisting of the Chairs of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the
Council, and the Committee on Trade and Development - with
authority to review national trade measures and propose con-
crete modifications, both privately and in public. 6 ° Operating
quietly and discreetly, the Group had some success.2
6
'
The lineal descendant of the Group of Three is the Trade
Policy Review Mechanism. 2  While the TPRM features more
elaborate information-gathering mechanisms and provides for
public discussion in the Council, though, it does not authorize
any "executive" official of GATT to pursue these discussions
with individual contracting parties, seeking to persuade them to
modify questionable trade measures.263 This sort of "gentle"
253. See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 189, at 1153-54.
254. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 58
(1987) [hereinafter HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES].
255. See supra text accompanying note 128.
256. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 254, at 66-67.
257. See HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 254, at 67.
258. See HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 279-80.
259. See HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 248.
260. See HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SysTEm, supra note 4, at 283-85.
261. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 283-84.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 208-18.
263. Such activity may, of course, take place informally.
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diplomatic procedure,264 first utilized by the Group of Three
over twenty years ago, would be a logical addition to the TPRM.
Authority to initiate formal dispute proceedings, however, must
remain the ultimate goal.
4. Implementation
The Uruguay Round texts would work major improvements
in the GATT mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing compli-
ance with decisions in dispute proceedings. 25 Additional institu-
tional developments, familiar from other contexts, would allow
the community interest to be even more strongly represented.
First, some community institution, presumably a branch of
the Secretariat, should be authorized to raise questions about
compliance in particular cases before the Council, much as rec-
ommended above in connection with the review of settle-
ments.266 Under the Uruguay Round proposals, both the original
complainant and any other contracting party could raise such
questions; 26 7 this should most often be sufficient. In some cases,
however, the complainant state might be satisfied with a level or
form of compliance that is insufficient from a community view-
point, or might be unwilling to press the issue of compliance for
political reasons. While third states could help fill the gap, their
role would likely be limited by the problems of rational igno-
rance and free-riding discussed above.
Second, some official community representative - the Di-
rector-General, the Chair of the Council, the Chair or members
of a narrower "steering committee, ' 26 8 or the like - should be
authorized to follow up on Council discussions of inadequate
compliance, much as the Group of Three attempted to intercede
with states maintaining questionable trade measures. While fall-
ing well short of formal enforcement power, this authority would
add a desirable "executive" element to the compliance process.
The public interest model also suggests three potential im-
provements in the sanctioning process, although - since the
Uruguay Round texts would already revolutionize the use of re-
taliatory measures 2 9 - further action here is probably a matter
264. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYsTEM, supra note 4, at 285.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 177-90.
266. See supra text accompanying note 227.
267. See supra text accompanying note 182.
268. See infra text accompanying notes 296-97.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 184-86.
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for the distant future. First, as with other procedures discussed
above, some community institution might be authorized to re-
quest the approval of retaliatory sanctions, both because com-
plainant states may be politically foreclosed from making such
requests, and because sanctions of a different scope or form
might seem appropriate from a community perspective. This
procedure would not raise the same textual problems under Ar-
ticle XXIII as community initiation of dispute proceedings.270
Second, a procedure for utilizing the multilateral suspension
of concessions as a true community sanction could be incorpo-
rated into the sanctions process. 2 71 Such a proposal was ad-
vanced within GATT by the developing countries, as part of the
1960s reform program including public initiation of dispute pro-
ceedings.272 While community retaliation might be appropriate
in a variety of situations, it could be particularly valuable in
cases brought by developing countries. Without multilateral par-
ticipation, the suspension of concessions by an economically
weak complainant state might have little impact on the noncom-
plying respondent. In extreme cases, the costs to the complain-
ant state of participating in the sanctions at all might be unac-
ceptably high.2 73
Finally, GATT should make an effort to develop forms of
remedy and sanction beyond compensation and retaliation.
Trade compensation to the complainant state may satisfy its
private needs,2 74 but it may not rectify damage to broader com-
munity interests or deter future noncompliance. In their reform
program, the developing contracting parties of GATT sought a
procedure for the award of financial compensation, rather than
trade compensation.275 As proposed, however, this procedure too
was purely private in nature. (A variant of this proposal - a
system of monetary fines - would be a public remedy, though
270. Article XXIII simply empowers the CONTRACTING PARTIES, following
consideration of a dispute, to authorize the suspension of concessions or other obligations
when they consider the circumstances serious enough. General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, supra note 36, art. XXHI.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 189-90.
272. See HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 254, at 58, 66.
273. See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 189, at 1154.
274. Even this may not be true once one disaggregates the national economy of the
claimant state: trade compensation often produces benefits for an economic sector differ-
ent from that which was injured by the offending measure, and it is difficult to judge
whether such compensation fully restores net national welfare.
275. See HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 254, at 58, 66.
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not necessarily a workable one.) Retaliation, whether by the
complainant state or the community more generally, cuts off
trade and reduces community welfare. 27e To this author's knowl-
edge, alternate sanctions and remedies have not been widely dis-
cussed in recent years. Because the existing procedures are
based in a purely private vision, though, further study of the
issue would be valuable.
B. Administrative Supervision
As noted earlier,277 the General Agreement gives the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES - and thus, by way of delegation, other
GATT institutions - substantial administrative powers: to re-
view (and even disapprove) 27s particular actions and agreements,
grant conditional waivers, monitor ongoing conduct, and the
like. The TPRM builds a community-oriented monitoring sys-
tem on these basic powers. Improved procedures for administra-
tive supervision might serve to advance community norms and
principles without resort to dispute proceedings, thus avoiding
the high-stakes problem of enforcement.
One approach would be to strengthen GATT's general mon-
itoring procedures, including the TPRM itself. It hardly seems
workable to make TPRM reviews either more extensive or more
frequent, at least in the case of the larger states. TPRM reviews,
however, are regular, periodic exercises, and have a retrospective
focus. Procedures for ad hoc and prospective review would sig-
nificantly expand the impact of the monitoring system.
The Leutwiler Report proposed one such procedure, sug-
gesting that, between periodic country reviews, the Secretariat
be empowered to initiate studies of particular national measures,
to call for additional information and "clarification" regarding
such measures, and to initiate discussions of them, presumably
in the Council. The impact of such a procedure would be even
greater if it extended to proposed measures, brought to GATT's
attention by the Secretariat's own research or under an en-
hanced requirement of advance notification. 280 A valuable execu-
276. For a fuller discussion of the benefits and weaknesses of retaliatory remedies,
see Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of
International Trade, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 501, 523-24, 528-32 (1985).
277. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
278. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 36, art. XXIV:7(b).
279. GATT, TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE, supra note 56, at 42.
280. For a discussion of current and proposed notification procedures, see supra
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tive element could also be added to such a procedure by author-
izing the Secretariat, following Council discussion or on its own,
to make representations on behalf of the GATT community to
states proposing the adoption of questionable measures.
The ability of GATT to monitor and review national mea-
sures in particularly sensitive areas could also be strengthened
further. Some steps in this direction have been taken during the
Round. For example, even though Article XIX of the General
Agreement already grants the CONTRACTING PARTIES a
role in monitoring proposed safeguards measures,""' the Ministe-
rial Declaration on the Uruguay Round called for safeguards
negotiators to focus, inter alia, on improved transparency, notifi-
cation and multilateral surveillance procedures; 2 ' the Safe-
guards agreement annexed to the Draft Final Act proposed mea-
sures of this sort. 83 Uruguay Round negotiators have also
focused on improving GATT surveillance in such areas as state
trading284 and customs unions and free trade areas,28 5 the most
timely and most difficult subject of all. Further improvements of
this sort are undoubtedly possible.
Though administrative procedures like these would increase
the authority of community institutions, they should not im-
pinge excessively on national autonomy. Because of the struc-
ture of GATT rules,2 18 6 administrative intervention would rarely
seek to prevent action by governments. Rather, it would most
often seek to channel national action into more desirable forms,
forms that are less distortive - tariffs instead of quotas, Article
XIX safeguards measures instead of market sharing agreements
- and more transparent, thus encouraging ongoing monitoring
by other contracting parties and community institutions.
Channeling of government action into more desirable (and
legally permissible) forms should also help minimize the outright
part III.C.
281. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 36, art. XIX:2.
282. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, supra note 34, Part I:D,
"Safeguards."
283. Agreement on Safeguards, in DRAFT URUGUAY ROUND PACKAGE, supra note 79,
at 183, 190-92, Parts VIII-IX.
284. See Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in DRAFT URUGUAY ROUND PACKAGE, supra note 79, at
285. This understanding was agreed upon ad referendum.
285. See Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in DRAFT URUGUAY ROUND PACKAGE, supra note 79, at
307, 309, para. 7-11 (draft proposed by chair of negotiating group).
286. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
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violations that weaken the entire GATT legal system. Greater
administrative supervision might well produce an increased de-
mand for waivers,287 making discipline in the waiver process es-
sential.28 A draft understanding on the waiver process, prepared
in November 1990, would make useful contributions in this re-
gard,289 but further improvements should be considered after
some experience with this understanding. The aim should be to
establish procedures that ensure that waivers are granted only in
truly "exceptional circumstances," and with substantive and
procedural conditions sufficient to protect important community
policies. Procedures for independent review and recommenda-
tions, like those suggested above for proposed settlements and
arbitral decisions, might also be desirable for dealing with
waiver requests.
C. Legislation
An active and effective legislative process is essential to a
public interest community. At a minimum, existing rules must
be clarified and updated as practices evolve and as perceptions
of the implications of fundamental community principles
change. Professor Hudec, among others, has often argued that
the success of dispute settlement procedures and related institu-
tional devices depends as much on community acceptance of the
current substantive rules as on the design of the institutions
themselves.2 90 In addition, it must be possible to generate new
rules to deal with emerging practices, especially those devised as
ways around existing rules, and to reflect emerging community
commitments.
The GATT legislative process has been shaped by a particu-
lar "constitutional" problem, the difficulty of amending the Gen-
eral Agreement. Amendments to some provisions require una-
nimity, to most, acceptance by two-thirds of the contracting
287. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 36, art. XXV:5.
288. Many contracting parties have recognized the need for greater discipline. See,
e.g., GATT, News of the Uruguay Round, No. 36, June 1, 1990.
289. This understanding would, inter alia, require the contracting parties to de-
scribe the exceptional circumstances justifying a waiver in their decision, set a termina-
tion date, and annually review both the justifying circumstances and compliance with
any conditions. See Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXV of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in DRAFn URUGUAY ROUND PACKAGE, supra note
79, at 312.
290. See, e.g., HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYsTm, supra note 4, at 209-10, 287-91;
Hudec, Unfinished Business, supra note 7.
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parties.291 In general, supermajority requirements like these are
probably desirable. If amendment were easier, the General
Agreement might be seriously weakened in periods of highly
protectionist sentiment. On the other hand, a number of GATT
rules have become out of date, and the difficulty of amending
them directly has led to the creation of a complex web of related
instruments, accepted by varying numbers of states, whose pre-
cise legal status is often uncertain.2 92 Because changes in the
amendment process would themselves require unanimous ac-
ceptance, these problems could endure for some time.
Most GATT rules, whether in the General Agreement or in
other instruments, are the products of negotiation and agree-
ment among some or all of the contracting parties. The process
bears little resemblance to more familiar legislative processes in-
volving majority votes in representative legislatures. A few im-
portant decisions have been taken by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES under Article XXV, but this procedure has by and
large been utilized with caution.29 s Just as important, most
GATT rules have been negotiated at increasingly long, unwieldy,
and exhausting "rounds," with substantive negotiations sepa-
rated by several years. This kind of legislative process cannot
hope to keep pace with changes in practice and perception in the
community at large, or to focus sufficient attention on the in-
creasingly complex issues coming onto the international trade
agenda.294
Others have pointed out similar flaws in the legislative pro-
cess. In his paper in this symposium, Professor Jackson points
out the need for an improved rule making process, while at the
same time observing how difficult it would be to design an ac-
ceptable process. 295 The Leutwiler Report urged that "GATT's
role as a forum for continuous negotiation should be developed."
It suggested the creation of a permanent GATT body, with lim-
291. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 36, art. XXX:1. Even if
an amendment is accepted by the required proportion, it applies only to those states that
accepted it. Id.
292. See JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING, supra note 58, at 26-30.
293. The agreement approach has important democratic overtones, at least in the
United States, since trade agreements are typically submitted to Congress, whereas votes
in GATT under an Article XXV procedure would likely be cast by the Executive branch
alone. See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 189, at 311-12.
294. For a discussion of the kinds of issues with which GATT will have to deal in
the post-Uruguay Round era, see Jackson, GATT and the Future, supra note 2.
295. Jackson, GATT and the Future, supra note 2.
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ited membership and a system of constituency representation,
meeting at the ministerial level. This body would have the polit-
ical functions of mobilizing support for GATT initiatives and
helping governments resist protectionist forces, 98 and would
"provide the stimulus" for the development of a system of ongo-
ing negotiations.9 7
A continuous legislative process might involve three ele-
ments. First, procedures should be developed by which the Sec-
retariat and other GATT institutions - drawing upon the infor-
mation produced by the TPRM, annual reviews of the trading
environment, dispute proceedings, and the like - could initiate
consideration of particular subjects and put forward specific pro-
posals. Individual contracting parties could of course initiate leg-
islative deliberations as well. Second, a representative body like
that proposed in the Leutwiler Report, though operating for the
most part at technical levels, might be authorized to conduct ini-
tial deliberations on subjects and proposals advanced for consid-
eration, bringing in governmental and nongovernmental experts
appropriate to the subjects before it for assistance. Finally, a
procedure might be developed whereby broader negotiations
could be convened as needed to consider proposals emanating
from the representative body. Such a procedure would be more
technical, managerial, and low-key than the current high-profile
negotiating process.
Proposals of this kind, however, raise complex and delicate
questions of law and politics, both international and domestic. A
detailed solution is well beyond the scope of this paper. For the
present, it is sufficient to observe that the public interest model
implies a need for serious consideration of improvements to the
GATT legislative process. The issue should appear high on the
post-Uruguay Round agenda.
D. Institutions
Throughout this section, I have suggested that concern for
the common interests of the community of trading nations im-
plies a significantly increased role for GATT institutions, most
often the Secretariat, but other institutions as well, including
some that do not yet exist. Exactly how these institutions should
296. The FOGS group's recommendation for more frequent ministerial meetings, see
supra part III.C, was motivated by a similar rationale.
297. GATT, TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE, supra note 56, at 48.
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be structured is another subject of such complexity that it can-
not be fully examined within a paper of this kind. I would, how-
ever, make two observations.
First, if GATT institutions are to function as representa-
tives and advocates of the community interest, the constitu-
tional structure of the GATT-MTN system must to some extent
be unified and simplified. As noted above, that system is at pre-
sent a Balkanized network of agreements, institutions and pro-
cedures, applicable to varying groups of states. It is difficult even
to conceive how extensive community-oriented procedures could
operate within such a system. The various proposals for a Multi-
lateral Trade Organization,298 designed to create a single institu-
tional structure to "serve" the various substantive agreements,
would be of considerable value. Of even greater value might be
the proposal, apparently advanced near the end of the Round,
for a common substantive agreement, unifying the obligations of
the General Agreement, the various "codes" created during the
Tokyo Round, and the substantive agreements reached during
the Uruguay Round itself. The move to a common agreement
might also involve significant costs, however.299
Second, it is more important that the institutions of GATT
be strengthened than that any particular institutional format be
adopted. GATT needs institutions capable of identifying, formu-
lating, and representing the community interest in the legisla-
tive process, in administrative supervision, in dispute proceed-
ings, and in the enforcement of community rules. Over time,
these institutions need to be given the appropriate powers and
authorities, as well as necessary financial and human resources,
to perform these essential functions. Whether these needs are
satisfied through a new organization, through reinforcement of
existing institutions, or through some other approach is of sec-
ondary importance.
298. See, e.g., JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING, supra note 58, at 93-100; Petersmann, The
Uruguay Round Negotiations, supra note 147, at 558-59 (describing the European Com-
munity proposal for a Multilateral Trade Organization).
299. The most obvious problem with such a move is that states unwilling to accept
all of the obligations rolled into the common agreement might be unwilling to adhere to
it at all, thus reducing the coverage of some basic GATT rules.
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